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Abstract 
 
This thesis concerns the outcome of social movements and why do some social movements 
succeed and others fail. By using various types of social movement literature I present a set of 
factors that have been known to influence outcomes. These concern the tactical repertoire and 
characteristics of the movement and the movement organizations. Of context relevant 
variables I pay heed to the existence of allies, fluctuations in public opinion and the tactics of 
authorities, which remains an understudied field of research within the field of social 
movements. I contend that a mix of movement characteristics and political context variables 
best explain the four movements.  
 
The cases in this thesis have carefully been selected so as to make up two successes and two 
failures in order to facilitate comparison. Using newspaper data, official reports and scholarly 
literature I seek to unravel the very complex relationships and go beyond simply finding a 
correlation between cause and effect by establishing whether plausible links can be found.  
 
My findings are that disruption and size of the movement are important determinants which 
are aided by both novelty and variety in actions. I also find that bureaucratization can both be 
a blessing and a curse. The latter is the case when organizations start thinking about their own 
survival rather than obtaining the best possible outcome, which can lead to a factionalization 
of the movement. Allies are relatively unimportant for explaining outcomes, but remained 
significant in the 2006 movement when they stalled the debates enough for mobilization to 
strengthen. Regarding public opinion it cannot alone explain social movement outcomes, as 
some have claimed. Movements are the most successful when they manage to influence the 
preferences of the public positively. Finally, the actions of authorities bear heavily on the end 
result by curtailing mobilization and forcing measures and reforms through parliament. I thus 
find that disruptive, big and united movements that employ a varied repertoire in a political 
context with favourable public opinion, substantial political allies and absence of specific 
authority strategies are the most likely to produce a favourable outcome. The main 
implications for future research are that it should include an increased focus on authority 
strategies and focus on both movement and context related variables. 
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”Aux armes, citoyens, 
Formez vos battaillons 
Marchons, marchons 
Qu’un sang impur 
Abreuve nos sillons” 
La Marseillaise 
 
 
1.0 Introduction   
 
The above quotation comes from the French National Anthem “la Marseillaise”, written just 
after the French Revolution in 1792. It illustrates the topic of this thesis in two ways. First of 
all because of its content alluding to violence, people marching and trying to oppose a corrupt 
political system. This last connotation is particularly relevant for me as I intend to study how 
a movement1 can obtain a favourable outcome when interacting with the state. Contentious 
interaction with the state is particularly prevalent in French history. Asides from the 
Revolution of 1789 one can mention the revolutions in 1830 or 1848. Another example is the 
“commune” in 1871, when workers joined together and took over Paris for over a month. 
Through collective action such as demonstrations and barricading, the people managed to 
hold the capital for quite some time. More contemporary events such as the strikes of 1936 or 
the enormous protests in 1968 have changed society and policies (Shorter and Tilly 1974; 
Tilly 1986). Contention seems to have been a recurring part of everyday life for several 
centuries.  
 
The second way in which the quote represents this thesis in a good way is that “la 
Marseillaise” is the current National Anthem, which illustrates the lingering and latent 
political contentious culture erupting every now and then in French society. This study is thus 
a look at contemporary contentious France, which is just as vibrant as before. For example, 
during several weeks in the autumn of 2010 strikes, demonstrations and occupations blocked 
the whole country in an attempt by workers, students and others to stop the planned reforms to 
                                                 
1 I will throughout the thesis denote the cases as social movements, protest movements or simply movements. 
This is purely for stylistic and linguistic reasons. 
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the pension system. This contemporary culture of contention is captured in the work by 
Dalton, Van Sickle and Weldon (2010). They find that French people are more favourable to 
using protest activities, defined as petitions, boycotts, lawful demonstrations, unofficial 
strikes or occupations, than citizens from most other countries.  
 
This culture of contention has materialized in similar movements to the one in 2010. In 2006, 
universities and schools were occupied for several weeks and streets were ablaze with 
demonstrations and strikes. Paris and province alike was blocked when in 2003 another strong 
anti-reform movement emerged. Also in 1995 a massive movement, lead by railroad workers, 
opposed yet another social reform. The movements were similar in many respects: they 
mobilized millions of people; concerned worker and/or student related issues; and enjoyed 
broad popular support. In one very distinctive way, however, did they differ, and that is in 
their outcome. In fact, the 1995 and the 2006 movement both succeeded and repelled the 
reform, whereas the 2003 and 2010 movement failed and reform was implemented2. This may 
seem as a puzzle. How come some apparently similar movements succeed and others fail? 
Why is this so? This leads to the research question: 
 
Why do some social movements succeed and others fail? What factors and mechanisms 
influence the outcome of a social movement?   
 
As can be seen my dependent variable is the outcome of social movements, namely whether 
they succeed or fail. I seek to identify the factors that influence this dependent variable and 
thereby answer the question why some fail and some succeed. In addition to explaining the 
outcomes of the four movements the goal of this thesis is twofold. First, I would like to 
increase knowledge of French protest movements, their interactions with the state and the 
factors influencing the outcome of these interactions. My second goal is broader. I wish to 
contribute to the burgeoning literature on the outcomes of protest movements. I hope to be 
able to shed light on the links between the actions and characteristics of the movement as well 
the political context, and different outcomes. I especially believe that an increased focus on 
the targets of protest must be taken into consideration and their actions must be analyzed. 
They should, just as the people participating in the movements, be considered as rational 
actors that seek to implement their own goals. They will consequently apply tactics and 
                                                 
2 See table 1 on page 49 for a quick overview of the principal dates and actors of the movements 
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strategies that will increase their own chances of success. This has to a great extent been 
overseen in the existing literature (Ingram et al. 2010). I believe that including these dynamic 
elements will help understand the relationship between social movement and state.  
 
1.1 Defining social movements  
 
Social movements have been defined in a plethora of different ways in the literature (Snow et 
al. 2004: 6). According to Snow et al. (2004: 11) social movements can be defined as 
“collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional 
or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, 
whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or 
world order of which they are part”. This very broad definition points to some important 
notions. The first lesson is that the degree of organization and continuity of a movement may 
vary. The actors act outside regular channels of influence, meaning that they make use of 
unconventional politics, and they do so in order to challenge or defend authorities, very 
broadly defined. 
 
I believe this definition captures the essential characteristics of the cases. The four movements 
all contain various degrees of organization and they take place over a certain period of time. 
One might however contend that many of the actors, or Social Movement Organizations 
(SMOs), enjoy regular access to the polity and as such the cases are not truly social 
movements according to the definition. Indeed, the unions, which make up the main part of 
the SMOs, are regularly contacted and negotiate with the state. However, it is important to 
remember that the movements in question occur precisely when negotiations do not take 
place, have collapsed or are deemed insufficient by the claimants (Lindvall 2011). As such 
they are acting outside the institutional channels. In fact the unions employ conventional and 
unconventional behaviour, including demonstrations, strikes, occupations and sit-ins. The 
various actions by which influence can be obtained can be distinguished between what is 
conceived as conventional politics and unconventional politics (Dalton 2008:65). These are 
more or less radical ways of trying to influence political decisions. It can range from voting 
and interest groups which are seen as conventional politics to petitions, boycotts, 
demonstrations, occupations and strikes which are part of unconventional or unorthodox 
political behaviour. What I am interested in is the ways social movements as a whole are able 
to influence the state. As such the tactical repertoire is merely individual components of the 
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movements and can be seen as a potential independent variable influencing the outcome, 
rather than the unit of analysis. Lastly the movements all seek to challenge authorities by 
opposing proposed reforms. This may set these movements apart, since most social movement 
research concern pro-active claims. However, I see this as a strength that can contribute 
profoundly to existing research, which I will discuss further below. 
 
1.2 Justification of research question 
 
Why this research question? Along with the feeling of belonging and identity, the obvious 
reason why people participate in social movements is that they would like to see 
someone/something change/or remain the same. Therefore, it should be of prime concern, 
both for people in general and for researchers, to try to understand what makes some social 
movements successful and others not. Many researchers also focus on social movements 
precisely because they believe them to be important (Burstein and Linton 2002: 384) During 
the past 30-40 years there has been a growing understanding both among students of social 
movements and citizens that social movements and protest are in fact rational means of 
influencing the polity (Meyer 2004). With this acknowledgment it becomes more and more 
important to understand the intricate ways in which different outcomes come about. Protest 
and social movements have been known to bring about major changes in the world. This 
includes the French Revolution, the revolutions that shook Europe during the late 1840s, the 
student movement of the 60s and even environmental and anti-nuclear movements of the 80s 
and 90s. So is also the case in contemporary France. These episodes are some of the most 
important events in France, and the outcomes of these have long-lasting consequences for 
people in general, participants, the economy and politicians alike. As such the conclusions of 
this study will surely be interesting for other than scholars.  
 
As King, Keohane and Verba (1994) argue, it is not enough for a research question to be 
relevant for the “real-life world”. It also has to contribute to an accumulation of knowledge 
within the literature. During the 1990s Giugni and others (1998:373; Kriesi et al. 1995:207) 
noted that little research had been done regarding how to explain the outcome of social 
movements. There has been much improvement over the past years, and as such the study is 
not of an exploratory nature (Amenta et al. 2010; Lijphart 1971). This thesis aims to test 
existing theories and build upon what has already been studied. Two clear shortcomings 
become apparent from the literature. The first one is linked to the variables. A lot of 
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“correlation” research has been conducted and thus the mechanisms that link cause and effect 
are badly understood. It is not enough to simply establish that a correlation exists, one needs 
to explain whether and in what way they are associated with the outcome. In many cases it 
appears as a black box to use the terminology of Elster (1998:70). For example, it is not 
enough to observe that a bureaucratic organization exists and that an outcome follows. One 
has to go within and see whether the outcome was facilitated by that variable or not. 
Furthermore, several independent variables have theoretically, empirically and logically 
differing effects (Della Porta and Diani 2006). This is also linked to the lack of specific 
variables and the frequent use of overarching concepts such as “strong state” and “favourable 
political opportunities” (Amenta et al. 2002). As such this intensive case study of four 
movements will help clarify the links between the variables and also how they interact.  
 
The second big problem with the literature is that it focuses to a large degree on the US, either 
exclusively or as part of a comparative framework. Very few try to depart from the US 
context completely (Amenta et al. 2010; Kriesi et al. 1995; Uba 2007). In fact, of all social 
movement articles published in 11 well-know scholarly journals between 1990 and 2007, 75% 
concerned the United States, whereas only 3% focused on Western Europe (Uba 2009: 436-
437). My study therefore contributes to existing research by adding a new and different 
political context. When it comes to the nature of the movements in this thesis they are also 
somewhat different from what other studies have focused on. The cases in my study, the 
1995, 2003, 2006 and 2010 movement, are all defensive, re-active movements that mobilize 
in response to unpopular bills and reforms. Most studies, have on the contrary concentrated on 
pro-active movements, although there are a few exceptions (Béland and Marier 2006; Doherty 
et al. 2003; Ingram et al. 2010; Uba 2007). This thesis will therefore bring new understanding 
to the analysis of such movements and can also highlight whether some variables act 
differently regarding these kinds of movements or in this particular context. As a side-note 
one can also mention the need for synthetic and comparative work on French movements in 
general. This is to a large degree lacking in the literature, even in the French one. As such the 
current study will also be of interest to French movement scholars.  
 
This study will therefore be a contribution that can help the accumulation of knowledge 
within the field of protest and social movements at the same time as it will be relevant for 
actors outside of the scholarly sphere. 
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1.3 The outline of the thesis  
 
In the next chapter I will develop the theoretical framework of the thesis. I will first discuss 
various general social movement currents. These veins of scholarship have all lead to 
important insights, notions and concepts that will be essential in the following part where I 
present specific theories concerning the outcome of social movements. I will focus on both 
movement-specific variables as well as context-variables (II). In the third chapter I present my 
method of choice. I conduct a multiple case study of four French protest movements (III). The 
fourth chapter concerns the four movements. For each movement a detailed timeline is 
presented with a following discussion regarding the outcome of the movement. I then go on to 
discuss each and every variable in order to establish whether it can be said to have any causal 
effect (IV). The last chapter summarizes and compares the findings of each movement. This is 
also where I come with my final conclusions (V).  
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2.0 Theoretical and conceptual framework 
 
I will first go through the traditional social movement literature in general. This is to give an 
overview of the different currents in the literature on social movements and protest, but also 
to introduce important notions and concepts such as deprivation and grievances, social 
movement organizations, and political opportunities. I begin by discussing the different 
schools of social movement theory, starting with collective behaviour theory, then the rational 
choice and resource mobilization paradigm, and finally political opportunity structure. I will 
show that none of these currents can escape criticism, but that they still present useful 
concepts that help make sense of the cases in my thesis. After that I present a theoretical 
framework relating more specifically to research on outcomes of social movements. I start 
this part by discussing the concept of success and outcomes and present a definition of this. 
Thereafter I present the most well-known theories regarding movement outcomes. I end up 
with a theoretical framework that incorporates both movement-centred factors and political 
context factors.   
 
2.1 Classical and collective behaviour theories 
  
One of the first to study the phenomena of movements was Gustav le Bon (1960). Writing at 
the end of the 19th century he referred to them as “crowds”. His theory is psychological and 
seeks to explain what happens to an individual when he participates in a crowd. This crowd is 
inferior to the individual and is good at acting but not at reasoning. Inside the crowd 
individuals lose their autonomy. Acting by instinct, they become primitive beings (Le Bon 
1960: 16).  
 
Although this largely negative view was toned down in the later current of collective 
behaviour theories, the negative experiences with fascism and Nazism during the interwar 
period still influenced these theories to see social movements as both irrational and dangerous 
(Meyer 2004). According to McAdam (1982, 2003) another factor that influenced the view on 
social movements was the widespread pluralist conception of politics among movement 
scholars. Dahl was one of the most prominent defenders of this view especially through his 
famous book Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (1961). According 
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to him policy-makers are receptive of this outside influence, and all social groups have access 
to the political system through the normal channels of influence. This meant that social 
movements using unconventional means of politics such as demonstrations, occupations etc., 
were acting outside what was seen as real, conventional politics and as such were irrational 
and un-needed (McAdam 1982:2).  
 
The broad category of classical theories includes different theories that share several 
similarities. First of all they see collective behaviour as being a reaction to social strain. 
Secondly, this strain puts different kinds of psychological pressure on individuals, meaning 
that the unit of analysis is individuals. Thirdly, the motivation to participate is not so much the 
desire to attain a goal as it is the need to manage the psychological tensions of the stressful 
situation (McAdam 1982:8-9). Thus, protest is seen as abnormal and irrational (Neveu 2005). 
I will exemplify these classical theories through a more thorough discussion of the arguably 
most famous component: Deprivation Theory.    
 
2.1.1 Deprivation theory  
 
This highly influential theory, which was coined by Gurr (1970) as the “Relative Deprivation 
Theory” (RD) soon became popular but also drew much criticism. His extensive theory builds 
on the seminal book called “Why Men Rebel?”. Gurr (1970) tries to explain why some people 
use political violence. The main idea is that deprivation leads to aggression which translates 
into collective political violence (Dalton and Kuechler 1990; Dalton 2008; Gurr 1970).  A 
basic assumption is that the propensity for violence among “men” is contingent on the 
discrepancy between the collective value expectations and the respective value capabilities 
(Gurr 1970:13). Value expectations are what people feel entitled to of goods and conditions, 
whereas value capabilities are what people think they are actually able to acquire in their 
current situation (Gurr 1970:24). Thus, when the discrepancy between these two values 
increases, the individual will see his/her situation as less good. According to Gurr (1970) this 
will lead him/her to perform violent actions.  
 
The relative deprivation approach remains mostly a psychological account of how frustration 
relating to grievances increases until collective action happens. Gurr (1970:15) recognizes 
that there are several societal variables that affect the degree of political violence. While these 
attitudes and societal conditions might be present in any given society for a prolonged period 
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of time, it is often when the RD increases dramatically that we witness political violence. RD 
is thus a catalyst for political violence (Gurr 1970:15). This approach has been used to explain 
both Civil Rights movement activism and the French Revolution (Dalton and Kuechler 
1990:7). Gurr (1970) presents psychological, individual level evidence, but also historical 
accounts which increases the validity of his theory.  
 
The theory has been heavily criticised by numerous scholars (Dalton 2008; McAdam 1982; 
Neveu 2005; Tarrow 1991, 1998). One criticism is that at any given time there will be some 
kinds of strain. Temporal confirmation of this theory can always be found, since grievances 
and strains will be present behind any movement (McCarthy and Zald 1979). However, it is 
less likely that one is able to find evidence on the level of strain and grievance over an 
extended period of time and relate this to different levels of social movement mobilization in 
different national contexts. One might say that social strain is a necessary, but not a sufficient 
cause of social movements and their use of protest politics (McAdam 1982: 11). In addition 
the link between the individual level of strain and collective action is hardly explained and the 
operationalization of the concept is lacking (McAdam 1982: 15; Neveu 2005: 43). 
Deprivation theory has also been challenged by many empirical studies (Dalton 2008; Kaase 
et al. 1979; McAdam 1982). Using World Values data Dalton (2008) for example shows that 
deprivation and marginalization seem to play marginal roles in deciding whether a person 
protests or not. On the contrary, education seems to increase the propensity to protest, which 
is contradictory to many of the conclusions of classical theory. Dalton et al. (2010) also find 
that there is generally very little correlation between deprivation and protest, but that it seems 
more plausible in less developed countries.  
 
Another criticism is the lack of consideration for political variables and the fact that 
participation in social movements is explained through psychological variables. These 
variables often frame demonstrators as having an abnormal psychological profile. As a 
consequence we should not see the claims made through protest actions as serious or 
important, as they are per definition just a by-product of the real function of protest actions 
which is to let individuals air their frustration. Movements and protest are not seen as a means 
to achieve influence or political goals, but solely as a venue for personal fulfilment which 
instils a sense of solidarity in people (McAdam 1982; Neveu 2005). 
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2.2 Rational choice 
 
Rational choice theory, springing out of Mancur Olsons’ (1965) “The Logic of Collective 
Action”, focused more on interest groups than social movements (Tarrow 1991:9). It has 
however been used extensively on social movements and its conclusions are very different 
from that of the “collective behaviour” current. What Olson (1965) pointed out was that it is 
in no way certain that collective action will come about even if the group of individuals has a 
goal they intend to obtain. This is because of the well-known free-rider problem which says 
that when benefits are attributed collectively individuals will have no incentive to participate 
as the person will still gain whatever benefit the movement obtains (if it obtains a benefit) 
without incurring any costs (Neveu 2005; Olson 1965). Selective incentives are needed for 
collective action to work. This could be insurance, money, extra benefits etc. Gamson (1975) 
largely confirms this by showing that organizations providing selective incentives are more 
likely to be heard and to succeed. However, this strong focus on economic variables and of 
people acting purely out of material interest has received much criticism (Neveu 2005:47; 
Dalton, Kuechler and Bürklin 1990:8). For one, the empirical evidence relating to the 
selective incentives approach has been challenged by for example Finkel and Muller (1998). 
They find that collective interests, such as belief in group’s success and importance of own 
participation, are more consequential for participation than selective incentives and perceived 
costs. This is not a criticism of rational choice per se, but it questions much of the research 
that has been conducted using a rational choice approach. A more fundamental strain of 
criticism comes from New Social Movement theorists such as Touraine (1978) who asserts 
that there is too much focus on economic interests and one thereby misses out on the many 
people for whom identity is important, and where the claims are all but materialistic (claims 
to citizenship etc.) (Neveu 2005:63). A different kind of criticism comes from the people who 
claim that the rational choice theory does not enlighten us on what really happens. This has 
lead some people to call it a “black box” which in the end does not tell us anything about the 
mechanisms that are on display (Neveu 2005:48) Despite this criticism the approach has 
brought attention to the fact that mobilization is difficult, and cannot be assumed to happen 
automatically (Neveu 2005:48). This would soon be taken up by a different strand of theories, 
namely the Resource Mobilization approach.  
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2.3 Resource mobilization theory 
 
It is important to note that while one refers to this as one theory it is in fact a cluster of 
theories. There is, according to Neveu (2005:49) a continuum of different theories that go 
from being fairly close to the rational choice approach of Olson, such as McCharty and Zald 
(1977) to the more sociological point of view of Oberschall (1973) or Tilly (1978)  
 
The more Olsonian part of Resource Mobilization (RM) theory, incarnated by McCharty and 
Zald (1977) focuses naturally on economic incentives. However, instead of focusing 
exclusively on the selective incentives solution of the rational choice school, the authors 
introduce new and important concepts. One of these is the social movement organization 
(SMO) (Neveu 2005:51). This organization is, much like a firm, an entity that identifies the 
objectives of its participants and seeks to achieve these objectives in the best way. It also 
helps aggregating resources, which are very important for social movements (Giugni 
2004:148) Adherents to this school see social movements as a tactical response to the fact that 
small elites hold almost all power, and focus the “attention to the Social Movements 
Organizations (SMO) that give meaning and direction to the movement” (Dalton, Kuechler 
and Bürklin 1990:9). These SMOs are part of what is called mobilizing structures which 
enable individuals to organize and participate in collective action (Garrett 2006: 203). 
Another important contribution of these theorists is asserting that there are potential 
contributors that are outside of the direct beneficiaries. These “conscience constituents” 
(Neveu 2005:52) can provide the movement with very important external resources. An 
increase of resources will make individuals able to create stable organizations. This will then 
help explain why some movements manage to mobilize more successfully than others, since it 
will often decrease the costs of action for participants. Oberschall (1973) expands the idea of 
resources and relates it to the group’s identity strength; the stronger the ties between 
individuals, the more “resources” for the group. Strategies can also be seen as part of the 
resources of a movement. 
 
A different current is exemplified by Tilly (1978). The first improvement of Tilly (1976) was 
his increased focus on the organizations and their “sociability”. Whereas McCharty and Zald 
(1979) saw organizations as a logistic phenomenon Tilly (1978) felt that organizations were 
more than that. Identities of participants are included as an independent resource even to a 
greater extent than in Oberschall’s (1973) theory (Neveu 2005:56-57). Tilly (1978) also 
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distinguishes between the challengers and the participants. However, he uses a more dynamic 
view of these groups as he points out that challengers will often be able to make alliances with 
certain weak participants in order to gain access to the system.  
 
The Resource Mobilization approach has several strengths (McAdam 1982:23-24). First of all 
it establishes social movements as a political phenomenon that should be understood as such, 
and the organizational and political context are emphasized. It establishes an understanding of 
social movements that includes relations with other movements and with other actors. 
Furthermore it sees, much like Olson (1965), the participants of social movements as rational 
actors who act, not as a treatment of abnormal psychological traits, which is the conclusion of 
many classical theories, but in order to achieve personal goals and interests. Lastly, attention 
is directed to the internal organization of social movements which is important for 
understanding any social movement. 
 
As the lower classes are seen as completely powerless by many theorists of this school, they 
see elite involvement as crucial in the development of protest on behalf of so-called 
challengers to the system. Indeed, according to some theorists many are “too poor to protest” 
(McAdam 1982:23). They therefore need external help in order to be able to protest. External 
involvement from elites is thus seen as positive. Elites will however often have different goals 
than the movement. This is one of the central lessons and criticisms of Piven and Cloward 
(1977). The resources that the movements receive place them in a dependency relationship 
towards the elites. The movements will often have to become less radical in order for the elite 
to continue the funding. This on the other hand faces the movements with the problem of co-
optation, in which they become totally dominated by the elite. In such cases they enter the 
domain of institutionalized politics where they lose. This will often also delegitimize the 
whole movement. RM-theorists also underestimate the power of the masses. The social 
movements can in fact contain considerable indigenous resources that make it possible for 
them to mobilize without explicit support from elites. McAdam (2003: 290) also criticizes the 
approach for not considering the fact that mobilizing structures are contested sites, which 
often will keep individuals from engaging in collective action. This comes from exclusively 
focusing on cases where SMOs etc. have facilitated this, and rarely including failed attempts.  
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2.4 Structure of Political Opportunities 
 
This current is an effort to increasingly put the social movement in a broader political context 
and understand the interactions between state and social movement. A central issue is to 
understand what parts of the broader political context influence mobilization, aspects of the 
tactical repertoire and the outcome of movements. One could say that the first theoretical 
current, classical studies, focuses on the micro-level, meaning individuals and what makes 
them protest. The second broad approach, RM-theory, evolves on the meso-level, involving 
social movement organizations. The last approach, Political Opportunity Structure, on the 
other hand concentrates on the interactions between the meso- and the macro-level, which in 
this case are the social movements and the broader political context. Whereas much of RM-
theory focuses on a purely economical view of rational action, this vein centres on rational 
interaction, in which actors have to anticipate the decisions of others in order to “calculate” 
their chances for success (Cohen and Arato 1992:521).   
 
One of the first to theorize the relationship between the state and social movements was the 
Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville (Tarrow 2010). As he undertook his voyage through 
America he found that the weak state did not interfere in the meddling of social movements 
and voluntary associations of civil society. Indeed, the state offered many different channels 
of access and influence, which gave incentives to participate in a moderate and conventional 
way. De Tocqueville contrasted this with what he saw as the oppressive and “aggrandized” 
French state which had suffocated the French nobility and made it a “parasite on society”. 
Because there were no intermediate bodies that could act as a buffer between state and civil 
society, the French became individualistic, acting on egoistic and narrow interests, with no 
greater good as a goal. This would result in sporadic but violent mobilization, which would 
culminate in the French Revolution. The conclusion was therefore that a strong state would 
strangle participation, and whenever there was actual collective action it would be violent and 
bloody (Tocqueville 1956). Although criticized for not paying close enough attention to 
details within the cases, this was still the first attempt to relate state structure and movements 
together, and is as such an early inspiration to much of the subsequent theories on political 
opportunities.  
 
The first one to conceptualize specifically a set of political opportunity structures in relation 
with protest was Eisenger (1973). He used the political context in order to explain the level of 
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rioting in different US-states. Eisenger focused on the “openness” of the state, meaning to 
which degree they were open to dissent. This was operationalized as whether there were black 
people in the local government and whether the local government adhered to the federal 
governments’ rehabilitation of living spaces. The most unfavourable environment for protest 
is either being very open: then the dissent is internalized into the city government, or being 
very closed, which means that the authorities would repress any dissent. This implies a 
curvilinear relationship. The structure conceptualized by Eisenger (1973), which focuses on 
the institutional and political context, has been reproduced numerous times (Jenkins 2003 et 
al.; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1995 et al.; McAdam 1982; Nam 2007).   
 
In the many studies using the concept opportunity structure, the understanding of what it is 
and the variables included in the analysis vary a lot. McAdam (1982) who included 
opportunity structure as one of three parts of his Political Process Theory, has no clear 
definition of what it is. It seems like any external change that facilitates mobilization is part of 
the structure (McAdam 1982:40-42). Kitschelt (1986) on the other hand distinguishes 
between input and output structures. Input relates to the access to decision-making. There are, 
according to the author, four factors deciding the input structure. 1). The number of parties 
(the more the better access); 2). The power of the legislative (the higher the more access since 
it makes the MPs more accountable); 3). Interest aggregation (pluralist leads to more access); 
4). Policy alliances (the easier they are to make the higher access). The more access-points the 
easier it will be for movements to influence and therefore the more incentives they will have 
to participate. The output structures, which relates more to the outcome will be discussed 
below. 
 
Another empirical study was undertaken by Kriesi et al (1995). They looked at Switzerland, 
Germany, France and Netherlands in order to asses the relationship between the broader 
political context and social movements. Even though their interest was predominantly New 
Social Movements, they included movements and protest actions originating from other 
conflicts such as labour. Their definition of POS refers to all “signals to social and political 
actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social 
movements” (Kriesi et al. 1995: xiii). The conceptualization of political opportunities includes 
more dynamic elements than Kitschelt’s (1986). Among the factors are the prevailing 
informal strategies that states employ in responses to movements and the alliance structures 
with the configuration of power on the left and whether the left is in government or not 
 15
(Kriesi et al. 1995: xiv). As these authors and others (McAdam et al. 1996) have argued such 
a distinction between the static and the dynamic aspects of POS is fruitful. This is first of all 
important because the two types of POS have different consequences and it will be easier to 
distinguish between the two if one keeps them analytically distinct. Another, methodological 
issue, relates to the way in which one would assess each of these two parts.  In cross-national 
studies one can better assess the static components of the POS. Kitschelt (1986) is one such 
example. Within-country studies are more suited for dynamic components that change within 
a short span of time (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996:1633). McAdam (1982) incarnates this 
second type of study. Within country studies in Federal states can however be used on static 
elements as these have a tendency to vary between regions (Jenkins et al. 2003).  
 
It is important to remember that political opportunities may not mobilize equally the whole 
population (McAdam et al. 2001:4). One example is the civil rights movement in the US. 
Changing opportunities, such as the arrival of a Democratic president, presented good 
opportunities for the mobilizing of black minorities, but not at all for other groups such as the 
Ku Klux Klan (McAdam 1982). Another example is the selective opportunities offered to 
various groups (squatters and regionalist claimers) by the different degrees of decentralization 
in several Western European countries (Wisler and Giugni 1996). A change in the political 
context understood as an opportunity for one group may in fact be considered as a threat by 
another challenger group.  
 
The political opportunity approach has helped our understanding of social movements in 
many ways. Most importantly it has linked the existence of social movements with aspects of 
the state and that this may vary with dynamic and static elements of the political context 
(McAdam 1982; Amenta et al 2002) It has also created some interest for other contexts than 
the American one (especially among European scholars who have adopted the political 
opportunity approach most frequently), although the main focus remains on the American one 
(Uba 2007). Finally it has helped explaining and making sense of cross-national differences in 
levels of mobilization, forms of mobilization and government strategies in response to 
mobilization (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 196). As such this is has proved to be a very 
fruitful concept for the development of social movement research.  
 
Political opportunities have also received much well-deserved criticism. Meyer (1996) for 
example criticizes much of the literature of not being well defined. Indeed, too often there is 
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no clear definition of what an opportunity is. By including too many aspects into the theory, 
we are certainly able to explain more of the variance in protest actions, however, we lose 
precision in what opportunities really are, and we might end up by explaining very little 
(Della Porta and Diani 2006). Indeed, as Meyer and Gamson (1996:275) famously coined it:  
 
The concept of political opportunity structure is in trouble, in danger of becoming a 
sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social movement environment. (…) It 
threatens to become an all-encompassing fudge factor for all the conditions and 
circumstances that form the context for collective action. Used to explain so much, it may 
ultimately explain nothing at all.  
 
One cannot help but think about the warnings issued by Sartori (1970) regarding conceptual 
stretching. By including too many aspects in the concept it loses its accuracy. By wanting to 
explain more with the theory we may end up with a tautological theory that cannot be proven 
wrong, or is just simplistic. There is little consensus on what the main aspects of Political 
Opportunity Structure are. Several hypotheses are contradictory. As Meyer (2004:133) 
discusses, certain authors (McAdam 1982) argue that expanding opportunities account for 
mobilization whereas others (Meyer 1993) contend that it is precisely the contraction of 
opportunities that leads movements to take to the streets.  A linked problem is the fact that by 
including different kinds of aspects in the concept of POS one may end up with situations in 
which a theory may be refuted or strengthened by the same kind of evidence. Meyer (2004) 
uses the example of grievances. Finding that grievances have had an impact on the 
mobilization of movements can either strengthen or weaken the theory depending on whether 
it has been conceptualized as part of the Opportunity Structure or not. As Meyer (2004:135) 
puts it “opportunity variables are often not disproved, refined, or replaced, but simply added”. 
There is thus little knowledge accumulation in the literature regarding political opportunities, 
and a clear lack of parsimoniousness in the construction of theories (Nam 2007: 114). 
 
Another criticism of the POS is that the interaction between big overarching structures and 
protestors is poorly understood. What mechanisms mediate between the institutional 
framework and protestors? How can institutions influence protestors? This has lead authors 
such as McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow (2001) to call for an increased focus on the mechanisms 
linking structure to protest. Some authors have claimed that movements need not perceive 
opportunities as such. They constantly try to mobilize their supporters and succeed when 
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opportunities are favourable (McAdam et al. 1996; Meyer 2004). They are naturally 
optimistic and always believe that they might succeed. Others have applied a rational choice 
approach, which means that movements have to perceive these opportunities and try to 
mobilize when changes to them occur (Tarrow 1998). This gives a cynical view of activities. 
A more nuanced view is perhaps that within any movement some committed activists will 
always try to mobilize, whereas others are waiting for cues and signals from authorities before 
they strategically take action (Meyer 2004:139). One mechanism that may help make sense of 
political opportunities is framing processes, which is to “assign meaning to and interpret 
relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and 
constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists“ (Benford and Snow 
1988). A framing process is therefore simply the act of creating meaning to the actions of a 
movement (Snow et al. 1986:464). If movement actors define a change in the political 
structure as an opportunity they will likely mobilize. If they on the other hand do not perceive 
any change or that the change does not present an opportunity for them they will maybe not 
mobilize. In some cases the framing processes can become a self-fulfilling prophecy (Benford 
and Snow 2000:632).  
 
There seems thus to be a progression towards a recognition of the political context in the 
research of social movements. This has proven to be essential in order to assess the political 
outcome and policy influence of social movements. I turn now to a more thorough discussion 
of the literature on what leads to different outcomes.  
 
2.5 Studying outcomes 
 
After this brief presentation of the different schools of collective action theory I now turn to a 
deeper discussion on what leads to different outcomes. Although this has not been as 
thoroughly researched as the sources of mobilization there is a substantial amount of literature 
on the subject (Amenta et al. 2010). 
 
2.5.1 What is success?  
 
I will first discuss different ways of conceptualizing success, defeat and more generally 
outcome. This is a very important task and is one all studies of movement outcomes need to 
 18
consider. Kriesi et al. (1995:207-208)  argues that the lack of research that had been 
conducted on the topic was mainly due to two methodological difficulties. The first one 
concerned the definition of success or outcome. It is indeed difficult and many authors have 
called for studying outcomes, impacts or consequences instead of success (Andrews 2001; 
Calvo 2007; Linders 2004). This is because success relates to the goals of a movement, and 
such goals may change over the course of the movement. Also, one should also admit that 
movements may spur unexpected and even contradictory consequences (Calvo 2007: 297). 
However, most authors end up focusing on success, even the ones claiming to look at 
consequences (Calvo 2007). Furthermore, it is the success of movements and their stated 
goals that is the most interesting outcome for both policy-makers and movement participants. 
I therefore choose to focus on success3, while being aware that there may be unintended 
consequences and that I need to pay close attention to the goals of the movement. For each 
case I therefore discuss the most prominent goals and demands of the movement. The second 
obstacle relates to the problem of causality and whether one can asses that the movement had 
a substantial independent impact on the outcome. This will be treated further in the method 
chapter and in the analytical chapter. I will now discuss more thoroughly how to define 
different outcomes.  
 
One can first distinguish between internal and external impacts. The internal concern the 
identities of the participants or the organization of the movement. This will not be considered 
further in this thesis as I intend to focus on external political consequences. A famous starting 
point for external impacts is Gamson’s (1975) dual conceptualization of success. The first 
relates to the degree to which the challenging group in question is accepted as representing a 
legitimate set of interests. The second concerns the introduction of new advantages or benefits 
to constituents and members. Kitschelt (1986)  calls these aspects procedural and substantive 
impacts. This approach has been further developed, and some see the introduction of new 
benefits as contingent on an already existing acceptance by the elites (Cress and Snow 2000). 
Later research has therefore to some extent gone away from acceptance and concentrated 
more on the collective benefits part. Amenta and Young (1999) distinguish between three 
levels of benefits from the state. The lowest, and weakest form of benefit are short term and 
minor benefits, such as a one time increase in spending on a particular social issue. Such 
benefits have often been criticized for being insubstantial and merely to show the public that 
                                                 
3 However, I will interchangeably use success and favourable outcome for linguistic reasons 
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something is being done (Amenta and Caren 2004:466; Piven and Cloward 1977). The 
highest level is a sort of meta-benefit, meaning that movements can gain a say over future 
benefits and increase these. Rebuking this kind of success would be very difficult. Such an 
example would be the right to vote. The most common level of benefit is the middle level, 
which means that the benefits are institutionalized and recurring and often more substantial 
than a low benefit. It can however be changed more easily than a high level of success 
(Amenta and Young 1999). One can further distinguish between proactive and reactive 
impacts. Proactive impacts mean that a movement is actively engaged in the introduction of 
new advantages. Reactive impacts on the other hand concern preventing the implementation 
of new disadvantages (Kriesi et al. 1995:210). One can say that movements with proactive 
claims seek decision-making power, whereas reactive movements take up the role of veto-
player (Kriesi 1995). Such movements have rarely been studied but for a few exceptions (Uba 
2007).  
 
One question remains however. If a movement’s success is linked to the initial goals, how 
does one establish what these goals are? Should it be the internal subjective feelings of the 
rank and file, or an objective measurement by outside experts of the goals? A middle-way 
exists by looking at “goals publicly presented in speech or writing to nonmovement actors 
such as movement targets, the media or bystander publics” (Burstein et al. 1995:282). The 
authors note that this is what most researchers use. Furthermore it is fairly easy to identify 
since such statements tend to be reproduced in the media. It is possible that official statements 
contradict each other, especially in this case where there is no single SMO, but a plethora of 
SMOs working together. It will therefore be important to locate such dissonance and include 
it in the analysis of whether a movement obtains a favourable outcome. One must however 
remember that goals and demands can be vague and not very concrete. It can therefore be 
difficult to establish at which point a movement has obtained the demands they were seeking.  
 
It is important to keep in mind that stopping new disadvantages may only be temporary. 
Indeed, it may be more appropriate to talk about postponing the introduction of new 
disadvantages instead of stopping it all together (Uba 2007). This could be linked to the 
collective benefits approach, since this explicitly calls benefits that can be withdrawn in the 
future middle successes, whereas benefits that cannot be withdrawn, or only with much 
difficulty (such as by changing the constitution) would be high successes (Amenta and Young 
1999). Adapting this approach to a re-active movement means that if a movement can 
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establish rules which prevent new disadvantages from appearing one can speak of a high level 
of success. If a withdrawal of a law happens without further consequences it can only be 
considered a mid-level success. 
 
For my thesis I will focus on such re-active movements. I will utilize the framework on 
collective benefits as a way to nuance successes. Some successes may be greater than others 
and some parts of the actors in a movement may obtain more substantial successes than 
others. This is also a point to remember: the goals and objectives of different parts and 
members of the movement may be different. Any given movement may contain certain pro-
active or re-active elements.  
 
In my thesis I define a movement a success “if the government, as a result of the mobilization, 
decides to withdraw the policy that was contested in the beginning”. I will also keep track of 
various other measures that can be said to be successful, meaning subventions and 
contributions. I classify these last measures as low or minor successes. Stopping a policy 
proposal is a middle success. A high success is relatively unlikely, but it would entail a 
redefinition of redistribution mechanisms or similar measures. This high success would 
actually include pro-active measures. Following the suggestions of Giugni et al. (1999) I will 
also focus on movements that failed. Most research has focused on movements that 
succeeded. Comparing similar movements, some of which failed and some of which 
succeeded will therefore be a substantial contribution to the literature in this area. Thus a 
definition of failure is also needed. A movement can be considered a failure when they fail to 
prevent a policy from being put in place. In other words if the opposed policy is implemented, 
despite the mobilization, the movement is a failure.  
 
2.5.2 Explaining social movement outcomes 
 
I will here present different factors that the literature has identified as more or less conducive 
to different social movement impacts. I start by referring to the well-know debate regarding 
whether internal or external variables best explain social movements outcome, which 
conditions the degree to which one sees social movement impacts as direct or indirect (Giugni 
et al. 1999; Giugni 2004). I then present the concept of protest avoidance strategy, which 
includes a new dynamic element in the equation, namely the action and strategy of the 
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government put in place in order to avoid protest and being influenced by social movements 
Lastly I discuss some important implications of the political mediation point of view, namely 
that one should focus on both movement related variables and the political context together. 
 
2.5.2.1 Different causes for mobilization and outcome 
 
Meyer (2004) cautions students of social movement outcomes to equate opportunities for 
mobilization with opportunities for success. Indeed, different dependent variables are 
concerned and the opportunities should therefore be kept apart. In fact, there seems to be 
evidence that a context that may spur mobilization may be exactly the context where the 
hopes for a positive outcome are the slimmest (Meyer 2004:137-138). This seems to be true 
when it comes to the strength of the executive. The weaker the executive the more access 
points, however the power to implement the demands diminishes, and therefore also the 
chances of getting policy demands through (Della Porta and Diani 2006:205-206). These 
issues have also been stressed by other authors such as Cornwall et al (2007), Meyer and 
Minkoff (2004) and Calvo (2007). 
 
2.5.2.2 Internal variables and direct impact  
 
I will in this part focus on the direct relationship between social movements and their 
outcomes. First I will focus on the debate regarding the efficiency of disrupting tactics and 
identify two important mechanisms. Secondly, I discuss another important and somewhat 
related debate regarding the degree of bureaucratization of an SMO. In addition I include 
considerations regarding the tactical repertoire and characteristics of a movement, namely 
whether they are big and thus send strong signals of discontent or employ a varied and novel 
repertoire.  
 
Disruption in opposition to moderation 
 
Among classical theorists there was little focus on movement outcomes, and when it was 
mentioned, outcomes were mostly seen as directly correlated with the degree of mobilization 
itself (Kriesi et al. 1995: 208). One of the first to explicitly focus on the outcomes of social 
movements was Gamson (1975). He contended that the more disruptive a movement is the 
more likely it is to succeed. This was a heavy attack on the pluralist model which argued that 
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moderation was more conducive to success in the American system. His work was followed 
up by others who came to quite similar conclusions such as Steedly and Foley (1979). Shorter 
and Tilly (1974), writing exclusively about strikes, found a positive relationship between the 
use of violence and the degree to which they obtain positive results. Piven and Cloward 
(1977) also found that disruption makes movements more likely to succeed. What is the 
theoretical argument for why disruption should increase the likelihood of success?  According 
to Piven and Cloward (1977) the poor (or others who are not part of the elite) have very little 
influence through the normal means of influence articulation such as the electoral channel or 
interest groups. Their only chance of getting their voice heard is through disrupting elites and 
threatening their privileges. By orchestrating dramatic, disruptive and threatening events, 
movements force authorities to respond (with repression or concessions) to their demands, by 
taking them off guard (Andrews 2001: 74). More precisely, through blocking the economy or 
causing much disruption the poor give “negative inducements” (Lipsky 1968; McAdam 1982) 
to the elites. These negative inducements, understood as “the withdrawal of a crucial 
contribution on which others depend” (Piven and Cloward 1977:24), can be threatening to the 
state, politicians and ultimately their re-election. The marginalised, who have few political 
resources, must use other means, such as protest. Should the movement become more 
moderate it will lose this power and will less likely be heard. If social movements try more 
conventional ways of influencing they will be co-opted into the system, just with less 
resources than everyone else and thus less power (Piven and Cloward 1977). Disruption will 
not always succeed, the answer from authorities can be repression, but without disruption 
obtaining a favourable outcome is impossible.  
 
Being too violent, however, can have detrimental consequences for a movement. First of all, a 
movement risks being heavily repressed by state authorities. Indeed, as Tarrow (1998) argues, 
violence happens in an interaction between state and movement, and this interaction can spiral 
out of control. Should this happen, less radical demonstrators may choose not to descend in 
the streets because they view it as too dangerous to participate. Thus, the movement will not 
be able to provide sustained pressure on the authorities. Secondly, violent protest may frighten 
potential allies among the elite. These elites may have wanted to support the movement, but if 
the protest actions are accompanied with too much violence it may be too costly, electoral 
wise, to support it. According to Mansbridge (1986) this was the case for the Equal Rights 
Amendments movement in the US where radical proponents alienated “middle of the road” 
legislators and voters (Soule and Olzak 2004). Thus social movements seem to be balancing 
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on a knife’s edge between disrupting just enough to create problems for the elite and make 
them see the underlying problems, and degenerating into too much violence and thereby 
alienating moderates, allies within the elite and public opinion.   
 
In more or less stark opposition to the concept of threat and disruption is that of moderation. 
Schumaker (1975) for example believes that militancy is not good and that moderation is the 
way for protest groups to achieve their goals. Some studies in the literature on disruption 
within  urban riots seem to find no or negative influence of disruption on riot outcomes (see 
McAdam and Su 2002 for a theoretical overview). Writing about movements for the homeless 
in various American cities Snow and Cress (2000) conclude that the influence of disruption is 
dependent on the political context. In this case the relevant factor was whether there had been 
prior signs of support for the movement. If yes, then non-disruptive means would be more 
efficient. If no, disruption through sit-ins and demonstrations would be most efficient.  
 
Some of the confusion as to the importance of disruption may be due to sloppy definitions of 
what disruption is. Disruption has been defined both as extreme violence and “some property 
damage or economic loss” (Uba 2007:21). I find a definition that equates disruption with 
violence too restrictive. Disruption may be much more, especially since the movements of this 
thesis are very big and can therefore incur considerable economic sanctions on a government. 
Because of their big size they regularly infringe on the mobility of others. I therefore include 
this within my definition of disruption. Disruption is therefore defined as actions by 
movements that “cause property damage, infringe social mobility for others or entail 
economic loss”.  
 
Bureaucratization  
 
Gamson (1975) argues that having a bureaucratic organization is most conducive to success. 
It will facilitate coordinating the movement and obtaining valuable resources that will help 
sustain the movement and its disruptive potential. Similarly, following the Resource 
Mobilization paradigm, McCharty and Zald (1977) argue that such an organization is imperial 
if a social movement can have any hope of achieving success as it is the only way to 
aggregate the needed resources in order to lay sustained claims on authorities. This is 
corroborated by Martin (2007; 2008) when looking at labour unions in the United States. 
Moreover, SMOs that are united internally and externally with other SMOs should be more 
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likely to succeed (Beamish and Luebbers 2009; Dixon 2010; Gamson 1975). Factionalizations 
may for example occur due to SMOs competing for adherents or funding (Rucht 2004: 209). 
This is shown by Tarrow (1993) when accounting for the educational reform following the 
events of May 1968. In fact there was a strong factionalization among teachers and students. 
This meant that the movement was unable to present a coherent alternative that could have 
inspired a more substantial reform. The result was a reform that was slowly deradicalized and 
made less consequential.  
 
The centrality of organizations has however been challenged by numerous scholars. 
Goldstone (1980) for example argues that organization seems to have little to do with success. 
Piven and Cloward (1977) present the strongest criticism of Gamson (1975) when they claim 
that bureaucratization is exactly what makes social movements lose. Inspired by Michels 
(1962) famous study of oligarchy within political parties, Piven and Cloward (1977) argue 
that it is by bureaucratizing, making the movement more like an interest group and entering 
the normal arena of electoral politics that a social movement will fail. As bureaucratization 
continues the SMO will gradually become more conservative employing more conventional 
and regular tactics. Since disruption is the prime resource of social movements, anything that 
keeps them from exploiting this will hurt the movement. This is the central difference with 
Gamson (1975). They all believe disruption to be favourable for movement outcomes, but 
whereas Gamson (1975) believes bureaucratization helps the disruptive potential of a 
movement, Piven and Cloward (1977) claim the exact opposite. In fact, when movements 
become bureaucratized they tend to favour the survival of the organization rather than the 
implementation of the movements’ goals (Della Porta and Diani 2006; Piven and Cloward 
1977). This quest for survival will lead to a search for external resources, which translates into 
a fear of co-optation as expressed by for instance McAdam (1982). He argues that elite-
involvement in the movement is likely to make it dependent on external resources. This will 
either lead them to be co-opted by the elite or simply dissolved due to the lack of resources.  
 
Characteristics of the movement and their tactical repertoire 
 
Another variable that is within the hands of the movement is its tactical repertoire, meaning 
the ways in which it tries to influence the adversaries in order to gain acceptance for its 
demands and goals. I will focus on four such characteristics: novelty, disruption, variety, and 
size (Taylor and Van Dyke 2004:279). I will not discuss the second characteristic, disruption 
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here as it has already been discussed at length above. When it comes to novelty, success is 
more likely when innovative tactics are involved. This can surprise and catch the authorities 
off guard. It will also possibly attract more media attention to the cause of the protestors. This 
is further enhanced by the fact that most movements stick to a fixed set of repertoires, that 
only slowly evolves (Tilly 1986, 2004). In France this could be seen during the 18th and 19th 
century. As decisions regarding the lives of ordinary people were increasingly taken at the 
national level the traditional repertoire including such actions as seizures of grain, charivara 
etc., became ineffective and gave way to the new repertoire which is composed of 
demonstrations, strikes, occupations etc. (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1986). This repertoire proved to 
be more efficient, but as it was used more and more often it too lost its novelty. Shorter and 
Tilly (1974) for example argue that strikes during the 1830s were much more successful than 
during the 1960s. This trend continued and was more apparent during the 80s and 90s 
according to Groux and Pernot (2008). All this corroborate the central insights provided by 
other scholars such as Tarrow (1998) as to the importance of using innovative and 
“surprising” tactics to obtain concessions from the authorities. Variety regards the use of 
various tactics. This has proven to be significant on numerous occasions, because it creates 
multiple ways of influencing which makes it harder for the authorities to repress them 
effectively (Morris 1993).  
 
The size of the movement also plays an important role. In fact, the more people participating 
the stronger the public display of numerical strength. The gathering of many people increases 
media attention and also contributes to the disruptive power of a protest by overwhelming the 
law enforcement and disturbing local everyday life. Morris, when researching the origins of 
the success of the 1963 civil rights movement in Birmingham found that the size of the 
movement most certainly played a role, partly because it increased disruption and 
overcrowded prisons (1993). Moreover, the signalling mechanism identified by certain 
scholars such as Lohmann (1993) Uba (2005) and McAdam and Su (2002) is linked to the 
size of protests. Large protests will send signals to politicians seeking re-election that they 
should change policy in order to be more in line with their voters. Such protests will inform 
politicians regarding the salience of the issue and the negative preferences of the public. Uba 
(2005) finds that the signalling mechanism (persuasiveness) is less important than threatening. 
McAdam and Su (2002) on the other are less conclusive. They contend that both being 
threatening and persuasive at the same time is the most efficient. It is important to remember, 
however, that a large demonstration may be largely peaceful, sending strong signals of 
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discontent, while at the same time being disruptive and thereby threatening the interests of the 
state. The signalling mechanism resembles some of Burstein’s (1999) mechanisms, which will 
be discussed further below.  
 
Similar for all these characteristics is that they call attention from the decision-makers and 
give new information as to their re-election, which in previous literature has been found to be 
a very important mechanism for obtaining favourable outcomes (Burstein and Linton 2002).  
 
2.5.2.3 External variables and an indirect relationship 
 
Other studies stress the importance of the political environment and context (Amenta et al. 
2010; Giugni et al. 1999). Such studies include McAdam (1982), Kitschelt (1986), Kriesi et 
al. (1995), Tarrow (1991, 1998), Meyer (2004), Burstein (1998; 1999), Burstein and Linton 
(2002) and Cornwall et al. (2007). These and others have argued that the degree to which a 
movement will have a favourable impact (or an impact at all) is largely dependent on the 
political context. A focus on external variables implies a more indirect causal effect in which 
the movement are at the mercy of a favourable context (Giugni 2004). I will here first discuss 
the role played by political institutions, including a short discussion of the French political 
system. I then focus on political allies. In the end I will elaborate on the place of public 
opinion within in social movement research. 
 
State structure 
 
Some of the earlier studies (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995) focused on the degree of 
openness and the strength of the state in accounting for the chances for success. A more open 
state will be more easily influenced, while a strong state will be able to implement policies to 
a much greater extent than a weak state (Kitschelt 1986:67-70). This is because such a state 
has the administrative and legislative power to overrule strong legislative minorities or 
interest groups that try to hinder legislation. As an example of an open and weak state 
Kitschelt (1986:66) uses the US where interest groups have much influence, a minority can 
obstruct the senate through filibusting and every bill has to go through both chambers, which 
are often held by different parties. It is also heavily decentralized. France is the example of a 
closed strong state. The executive clearly dominates the legislative and can push through 
laws. The bureaucracy is also seen as very effective in implementing policies. Furthermore, it 
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is a strongly centralized4 state with few ways of influencing decisions other than during 
elections. These very different constitutional arrangements make for dramatically different 
realities and contexts for social movements. For substantive changes, relating to new 
advantages, the best environment would be an open but strong state, and secondly a closed 
and strong state. The most important is thus a system in which the state is powerful enough to 
enforce its laws (Kitschelt 1986). Kriesi et al. (1995) develop on the ideas of Kitschelt (1986). 
They conclude for example by saying that the impact of gains obtained by a social movement 
will be higher in a strong state, however, if it is closed such as in France it will be almost 
impossible to obtain. These views have been criticised for forgetting that movement influence 
vary over time and furthermore that the state may not have the equal bureaucratic 
implementation power on different issues (Amenta et al. 2010:198).  
 
The French political system 
 
Although the institutional arrangements will vary to a very small extent between the cases I 
will here present more thoroughly the French system and how a law is voted as this will prove 
to be vital in order to understand aspects of interactions between state and society. This has 
also been identified as central in understanding different outcomes (Andrews 2001: 73).  
 
France is often described as a semi-presidential regime, meaning a system in which there is 
both an elected president and a prime minister dependent on the parliament. The president is 
widely regarded as more powerful than the prime minister. However, this is not due to his 
legal powers, but more linked to the fact that he is elected by popular vote, enjoying a high 
legitimacy due to the two-round ballot5, and that he appoints the prime minister. Indeed, the 
president has weak constitutional powers. In fact, Roper (2002) classifies France as number 4 
out of 10 premier-presidential regimes in Europe when it comes to institutional powers. For 
example, it is the prime minister that fires his cabinet ministers and not the president. Still, the 
de facto power rests within the hands of the president. When president and prime minister are 
from different parties a situation called cohabitation occurs. This means that the power 
                                                 
4 This conception of France has however recently been challenged as the country since 1982 has gone through a 
strong regionalization process. Regions gained in importance and their existence was secured in the constitution. 
Furthermore, the competences of regions were expanded and their members were elected directly by the people. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between region, department and municipality remains unclear, and the state retains 
all legislative power Maud Bazoche, Département Ou Région? Les Réformes Territoriales De Fénelon À 
Jacques Attali (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2008).. France is thus still a closed and strong state, albeit less than before. 
5 This implies that the president will always be elected by a “majority”, thereby giving him an artificially high 
numerical legitimacy.  
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arrangement to a large degree tilts back to that of the constitution, and the president retains 
control over foreign policy whereas the prime minister is preoccupied with domestic affairs. 
This situation has occurred three times, 1986-1988, 1993-1995 and 1997-2002. A recent 
change to the presidential tenure, which aligns it with that of the assembly, has made 
cohabitation much more unlikely (Berntzen 2008). 
 
The prime lesson here is that the executive, be it the president or the prime minister, keeps 
power over the legislative which in many cases will not or can not oppose the executive. A 
well-known way of curtailing the powers of parliament is by proposing a package of laws, on 
which no amendments can be made, except for the ones accepted by the government. This is 
called blocked vote or unique vote and can be found in article 44.3 of the constitution 
(Assemblée Nationale 2011). Another power is the use of article 49.3 of the constitution 
which allows the government to push a law through parliament without a vote. The only way 
to prevent such a law from being adopted is to place a motion of no confidence within the 24 
hours after the use of the article (Suleiman 1994). This shortens the debate and forces 
hesitating deputies of the majority to vote with the government (Balme 1998). Recent 
constitutional changes made it useable only in financial and social security issues and once 
every year (session) it can be used on any law proposal (Assemblée Nationale 2011). It still, 
however, remains a considerable power for the French government. The legislative body, 
which is composed of the Senate and the “Assemblée Nationale” (National Assembly), 
remains fairly weak, especially when prime minister and president belong to the same party. 
However, since 1974, 60 deputies or senators can appeal to the Constitutional Council which 
will rule whether a new law is contrary to the constitution. If a law or part of a law is found to 
have been in contradiction with the constitution it cannot be promulgated without changing or 
dropping the contested aspects (Stone 1989). This is one of parliaments few powers and is 
widely used by the opposition. Nevertheless power resides firmly within the executive.  
 
Allies 
 
Others have focused on the presence of allies (Lipsky 1968; Tarrow 1998). Having allies 
seems crucial for any social movement to achieve success. These allies can be in civil society, 
government, opposition, political parties etc. When it comes to the outcome what is mostly 
needed is the ability to act. Therefore, having allies among decision-makers is generally 
viewed as positive for the outcome. This will increase the chances for success as it is a way of 
 29
introducing claims on the governmental agenda and legitimizing the movement. Indeed, allies 
will carry into the institutional arena the issues that are being addressed by social movements 
in the public space (Giugni 2004: 120; Giugni 2007: 55). As such the more allies a movement 
has among decision-makers the better their chances for success may be. Political parties, 
being dependent on support in order to win elections, are often considered as the most 
important and probable allies of movements. While in opposition they will often, in their 
eagerness to win elections, align themselves with movements. However, this may change 
while in government as they may want to ensure re-election by appealing to its core-
constituents’ main economic interests which may not always be in the interest of social 
movements (Della Porta and Diani 2006: 215; Kriesi 1995: 182). Although the opposition and 
government do not alternate among the cases, and therefore this is not something I will be 
able to test, two important insights are still useful. First, governments may not want concede 
to social movement demands because it would weaken them among their prime constituents. 
The second, and related insight, concerns the role of elections. In fact, electoral competition 
will often condition the position of potential allies towards claims from social movements. 
According to Piven and Cloward (1977) it is only when it is deemed reasonable for political 
parties, electorally speaking, to support social movements that these will have any chance of 
obtaining a favourable outcome. Thus political instability favours social movements and their 
success by inducing potential allies to support these movements. The importance of elections 
will be further developed below. 
 
Public Opinion 
 
To understand fully the impact of social movements one also has to include public opinion. 
Giugni (2004) for example argues that for a social movement to have any chance of major 
success it needs to have public opinion on its side.  When authorities feel that an issue is 
important and salient to the public, they will be responsive (Giugni 2004:192). He finds the 
most promising results when public opinion is included with the effect of political alliances. 
Whalstrøm and Peterson (2006) also found that public opinion proved influential in the 
Animal Rights Movement in Sweden. This is because if the government decides to go against 
preferences held by the majority they may risk losing a re-election. Soule and Olzak (2004: 
479) note that it is especially under periods of political competition, meaning before elections, 
that public opinion will be followed. Similarly, Calvo (2007) argues that party leaders may 
have a tendency to implement reforms, satisfying claims of social movements, in order to 
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improve their electoral performance (298). This indicates that social movements enjoying 
favourable public opinion are more likely to succeed.  
 
Some go even further and say that social movement influence is compromised by public 
opinion, and that there is little, if anything, left to be explained when public opinion is 
included (Burstein 1998; Burstein and Linton 2002). Burstein (1999) contends that 
movements have very little impact directly on policy, especially when facing a strong and 
popular majority, meaning that social movement actions matter very little when public 
opinion is included. There are in practice only three ways that a movement can influence 
policy. 1). it can change the legislators’ perceptions of the preferences of the public. The more 
new information the movement can offer policy-makers the greater chance for success; 2). it 
can change the perceptions of the public themselves. The more impact the movement has on 
the public’s preferences the more impact it will have on legislation; 3). it can change the 
salience of the issue for the public. By making a seemingly (to the public) unimportant issue 
seem more important the movement can indirectly influence policy. Social movements can 
have an indirect impact on policies by making politicians fear they will lose votes by not 
responding to the claims of the movement. It is thus through the electoral channel that the 
greatest threat for politicians come, and social movements are more signs of discontent than a 
direct threat. Uba (2009), conducting a similar meta-analysis to Burstein and Linton (2002), 
contradicts their findings and notes that social movements do have an impact, even when 
public opinion is included. She also notes that the most important may not be general public 
opinion but perhaps the preferences of some core part of the electorate (Uba 2009: 439). 
 
2.5.2.4 Protest Avoidance Tactics 
 
The last aspect I will focus on is the strategy of authorities. This has largely been ignored6 in 
the literature despite the fact that it has been stressed that one should focus on the relations 
that a movement enjoys with other actors such as governments (Fantasia and Stepan-Norris 
2004; McAdam et al. 2001). If authorities are hostile to the goals of a social movement they 
may try to keep the social movement from mobilizing successfully and split it. This is what 
Béland and Marier (2006) call “Protest Avoidance”. It was originally conceived as a way to 
understand how politicians in a highly centralized political system could implement unpopular 
                                                 
6 Except for protest policing and direct physical repression (Della Porta 2006: 197). 
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reforms. The authors want to bridge the protest avoidance perspective with the normal aspects 
of the social movement literature, and they contend that it constitutes a normal part of the 
political environment that needs to be considered (Béland and Marier 2006). Protest 
avoidance theory need not concern only pension reforms or other unpopular reforms 
instigated by the government. Any time a government considers a group’s demands to be 
problematic they may engage in protest avoidance tactics. Although the theory in this thesis 
will be used on big social movements with reactive claims, it is an aspect that should be 
included in any social movement research. According to Béland and Marier (2004, 2006) 
protest avoidance tactics consist of at least four distinct aspects. 1). Firstly, enacting the law 
during a period of time when workers or students are on holiday will prevent them from 
mobilizing at a full potential. It will be hard to get back to the same mobilization potential 
afterwards. 2). The second aspect concerns the geographical location of the subject of 
contention. By placing it far from people the disruptive effects are lessened. 3). Bargaining 
with important actors in the social movement in order to factionalize them and keep them 
from coordinating successfully constitutes the third aspect of the theory. Krinsky and Reese 
(2006) also note that the authorities may engage in selective bargaining with certain parts of a 
movement in order to break it (626). This draws upon Gamsons’ (1975) lessons which tells us 
that the factionalization of a movement can be very damaging. 4). The final part relates to the 
authorities’ efforts to frame reform as inescapable in order to make protest seem futile. Used 
on the reform attempts of 1993, 1995 and 2003 especially the first and third aspect seemed to 
be the most important (Béland and Marier 2006:307-308). Since this is an understudied theme 
and Béland and Marier (2006) explicitly recognize that this is not an exhaustive list, I will 
also try to identify new aspects of the tactical repertoire of governments. As has been 
discussed disruption seems for some authors to be more efficient than moderate actions. 
Protest avoidance tactics can thus be seen as an effort by the authorities to pull the conflict 
from contentious politics back to routine politics in which the state has a better control of 
affairs (Béland and Marier 2006:299).  
 
2.5.2.5 Political mediation approach and the joint effect 
 
External and internal factors can be regrouped together under what is known as the Political 
Mediation Approach. It too focuses on external factors, but is more explicit about the 
interplay between social movement characteristics and external factors. Giugni (2007; 2009) 
calls this the joint-effect approach, which signals that rather than favouring a direct or indirect 
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impact of social movements one should consider the simultaneous interactions between 
variables which create a joint effect. The main question asked in this theory is “under what 
conditions are social movements likely to be influential”, and not whether movements are 
generally successful or whether certain aspects of movements are always influential (Amenta 
et al. 2005:517-518). An important vein within the political mediation approach has also taken 
to criticize current theories of movement outcomes. In fact, the variables that are employed 
currently are either too abstract or too broad. For example is it rarely clear what is meant by 
an open or closed institutionalized political system (Amenta et al. 2002:52). This makes them 
very difficult to test empirically, something which has also been deplored by Meyer (2004).  
 
The essence of the theory is that the political context, or opportunity structure, mediates the 
mobilization and demands of the movement. The context may be favourable, in which case 
mobilization does not need to be very strong in order to obtain favourable outcomes. If 
however the movement faces an unfavourable context it will need much mobilization and 
strong assertiveness in order to have a favourable impact on policy. This does not mean that 
favourable outcomes are impossible in a “hostile” political context, merely that social 
movements are more likely to exert an influence when the political context favours it (Soule 
and Olzak 2004: 482). Rather than focusing on bureaucracies, and the horizontal dispersion of 
power which some authors following the political mediation approach have done (Amenta et 
al. 2005), I use the  central insight of the approach, which is that in order to understand 
movement outcomes one needs to take into consideration both the actions and characteristics 
of the movement itself and the political context (Soule and Olzak 2004). It is thus a 
combination of factors that lead to a particular outcome, and one independent variable may 
only be potent if interacted with another. Only by including both movement related factors 
and the political context can one understand the complex outcomes of social movements.  
 
My model therefore builds on an extension of the political mediation model. It includes the 
actions and the characteristics of the movement in question which mobilize under the 
constraints of the strategy of the authorities. The characteristics include the degree of 
disruption, novelty, variety and size, as well as the nature of the SMOs and their degree of 
unity. This is mediated by the broader political context, which includes allies, public opinion 
and the strategies of the authorities.  
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3.0 A multiple case study of four movements  
 
When choosing a method it is important to keep the research question in mind and especially 
regarding what it is one wants to explain. Certain methods lend themselves better to explain 
certain kinds of events or causal relationships, and one should therefore consider carefully 
which method is the most appropriate (Gerring 2004). No method is however the best method. 
Although there seems to be a stark opposition between quantitative and qualitative research, 
both have their virtues and pitfalls, and the choice between the two should be based on the 
shape and content of the research question, not on some apparent disapproval for either one 
(Tarrow 2010: 252).  
 
I conduct a multiple case study of four French protest movements. In this chapter I will 
explain this choice by discussing my research question and the complex relationship between 
the independent and dependent variables. I will here show that in order to understand the 
complex nature of causation in these movements one has to go deep in each movement and 
prove that there are in fact causal links between the proposed variables. I also define the scope 
of the study and the entities to which generalizations can be made. I argue that this is best 
done through multiple case studies which will increase the explanatory power of my 
conclusions. This is also due to the fairly high number of variables. All these are concerns that 
have been voiced by various scholars in the movement literature. I will secondly discuss my 
data sources. The main bulk of my data is newspaper data. Other significant sources are 
various official reports, organizational reports and academic studies that have been conducted. 
Interview data and observations were not deemed necessary, although they could have shed 
light on the phenomena. Observations could not be made because I study phenomena that 
have already ceased to exist. Interviews with activists could have yielded information about 
the interpretations of events by the actors themselves, but were not possible within the scope 
of the master thesis. 
 
3.1 The research question and my goals for the thesis 
 
As stated before my research question is:  
Why do some social movements succeed and others fail? What factors and mechanisms 
influence the outcome of a social movement?   
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My intention with this study is threefold. First, I want to understand why the specific four 
movements, that may appear similar, experienced the disparate outcomes they did. Second, I 
aim to identify general factors that contribute to outcomes of protest movements in general in 
France. My third goal relates to establishing and clarifying some of the relationships between 
the independent and dependent variable(s) in the general social movement literature. The 
degree of certainty of my conclusions will of course be strongest for the four specific cases. 
My study is a good example of a theory-confirming or theory-infirming study to use 
Lijphart’s (1971: 691) terminology. Although he notes that such case studies are only 
marginally useful for the building of theories, I argue that such studies can come with 
important corrections and refinements to the existing theories (Gerring 2004; Yin 2009). I 
thus seek to discover the factors and variables that may influence a movement’s chances for 
success. This is therefore a question of causation. The case study is particularly apt at 
explaining “how” and “why” questions (Yin 2009: 9). Such studies often deal with 
establishing causation through links between variables and outcomes (George and Bennett 
2005). This is different than the logic underlying quantitative research (large-N) which 
according to well-known criticisms establishes broad correlations and frequencies rather than 
causality (Ragin 2004). The study of movements and contentious politics is very complex 
where many of the main variables are badly defined and the links with the outcome are not 
always well understood (McAdam et al. 2008; McAdam and Tarrow 2010). The problem of 
equifinality, meaning that any particular outcome may have several different causes (George 
and Bennett 2005:10), has been identified in certain studies, especially in the US regarding 
movements focusing on old-age pensions (Amenta et al. 2005). Making sense of this can best 
be done through an intense case study. Furthermore, there is evidence that some of the 
variables are interactions and do not develop independently of each other, making them less 
suitable for large-N research. The case study is an interesting method for establishing the 
relationships and bringing more clarity as to the exact links between the variables since the 
case study is especially adept at uncovering interaction effects (George and Bennett 2005: 
46). I therefore see the case study as most apt to answer my research question. I now turn to 
discussing the case study and particular problems that I may encounter when conducting this 
study.   
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3.2 What is a case study? 
 
Case studies have been conducted in social science ever since its inception during the 19th 
century. However, with the advent of new statistical methods and more sophisticated data-
analysis programs quantitative cross-national analysis gained stronger ground, especially 
since it opened up the possibility to generalize on a wider scale (George and Bennett 2005:3-
4). The case study in fact seemed out of favour among most students of political science. As 
Gerring (2004:341) notes the case study as a method has been heavily criticized and many 
have promoted the view that case studies are in some way inferior to experimental and 
statistical research. Still, a large number of case studies and other qualitative research are still 
published, and contributes strongly to our understanding of the world (George and Bennett 
2005; Gerring 2004; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). This has called for a renewed 
interest in the use of this method. With this in mind it is suitable to ask what exactly 
constitutes a case study. According to Gerring (2004:341) a case study is an “in-depth study 
of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar’s aim is to elucidate 
features of a larger class of similar phenomena”. With unit is meant phenomenon such as 
revolution, nation-state, protest movement etc. This definition has the merit that it does not 
include any bias towards qualitative or quantitative methods (researchers using the case study 
approach can and do utilize quantitative methods). Furthermore it clearly links the unit to a 
larger group of phenomenon to which inferences in various degrees should be made. Gerring 
(2004:342) presents a typology of three different types of case studies based on how co-
variation is observed: single unit over time; within-unit at one point in time; or within-unit 
over time. My study of French protest actions will be of the latter type as I have several 
different movements that will be compared over a certain period of time. George and Bennett 
(2005) offer a similar understanding of what a case is. A case for them is simply an instance 
of a class of events (George and Bennett 2005:17). A case study is therefore a study of such 
instances. This definition also refers to a broader category. However, it has the merit that it 
does not confuse case with unit, which in my opinion is apparent in Gerring (2004). This 
opens up the possibility of having multiple cases (instances of a class of events).   
 
Following the definition of George and Bennett (2005) one can argue that I conduct a 
comparative case study. Since there are four movements in my study it constitutes what is 
often called a multiple case study. According to Yin (2009: 53) the multiple case study is 
simply a different form of case study. Because there are more cases the conclusions that one 
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draws are more robust than when using just one case (Johnson et al. 2008: 152). Yin (2009: 
56-57) explains that behind the multiple case study lies a replication logic which implies that 
every case is treated as an individual case study and later, a cross-case study comparison is 
conducted where the results of each case are compared. This is exactly what I intend to do. 
When choosing cases on the “two extremes” of the dependent variable (yes / no, high / low, 
success / failure) one has a “two-tail” study. These are more complicated than other studies 
since for the replication logic to be effective one needs two cases in each category. I heed his 
call and therefore include two cases for each “extreme”, namely “success” and “failure”. I 
include “failure” because research has often only concerned successes (Giugni 1999). 
 
This selection of cases corresponds to what Gerring (2008: 652) defines as a diverse case 
study, involving cases selected because of their variation on some kind of variable. In this 
case the variation in the dependent variable, namely the outcome of the movements, was the 
prime tool for selection. This clearly breaks with the advice given by certain scholars not to 
choose on the dependent variable. However, in my thesis this is a conscious choice so as to 
assure that there is variation in the dependent variable. Choosing on the dependent variable 
first becomes a problem when “there is no variation to be explained”. This vision has also 
been criticized by qualitative, case-oriented scholars such as Ragin (2004) as being irrelevant 
when applied to case studies. 
  
In addition to this there are certain other caveats that have been proposed by mainly 
quantitative scholars. Much of the critique towards case studies comes from the fact that one 
supposedly focuses on a very limited amount of information, taken from only one or a few 
cases (George and Bennett 2005:22-33). This may lead to a lack of representativeness. The 
case may not be representative of other cases and the conclusions drawn from the former may 
not be transferable to the latter. Quantitative, large-N studies are therefore superior because 
generalizations can more easily be made. This can be traced back to proponents such as 
Przeworski and Teune (1970:21-22) who favour parsimony and generality over accuracy. 
Making less accurate theories that can more easily be transferred to many contexts is therefore 
the goal. However, as many have pointed out, this is not the goal of most qualitative research. 
In fact, providing explanations for a defined set of outcomes is more often the main aim of 
case studies. King, Keohane et al. (1994) furthermore state that while parsimony might be 
desirable, the trade off is less clear than what Przeworski and Teune (1970) seem to think. 
Indeed, theories should be as complex and accurate as the evidence suggest. Explaining and 
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identifying the links between cause and effect is just as important as making wide-spread 
generalizations (Elster 1998; Ragin 2004). Yin (2009: 15) also argues that analytical 
generalizations to general theory are possible with case study evidence, which should not be 
confounded with statistical generalizations to populations and universes. It is important to 
keep these considerations in mind when discussing the implication of ones findings. One 
should therefore draw limited generalizations, while at the same time being careful not to 
generalize outside the population of cases and claim that one is making generalizations 
applicable to a wide array of cases (George and Bennett 2005).  
 
I now turn to delimitating the scope of the case study and what really the case in this study is.  
 
3.3 What is the case in this study? 
 
The class of events is social movements following the definition given in the first chapter, and 
the subtype of this class of events is major reactive social movements. Defining this in a good 
way is imperative for further research (George and Bennett 2005:69). Reactive means that the 
movements in question mobilize in reaction to reforms initiated by the government. By major 
I mean national movements that involve many people over a certain period of time7. All the 
cases should be instances of the same class of events, meaning that there should be no doubt 
that we are comparing the same type of events. This will to a large extent depend on the 
research objective. If one seeks to identify what and in which way protest movements achieve 
success, it does not make sense to put in the same category instances as different as protest 
movements and interest groups. However, if the research objective was to understand how 
citizens can influence politicians between elections, such a classification might be warranted. 
Why do I specify major reactive social movements as a subcategory? This is partly out of 
empirical and practical concerns. It limits the universe to a more manageable amount of cases 
(according to Fillieule (1997, 2003) the number of demonstrations in France totals up to more 
than 10 000 per year and is increasing. Choosing between these would be very hard). The 
selected cases are also the biggest events and therefore the events for which the best data 
material exists. Furthermore, these are the protest events that have marked France the most 
                                                 
7 I avoid indicating a precise amount of people since this would be highly arbitrary as there is no theoretical 
grounds for specifying a specific amount. There are in addition many ways of participating in a movement 
(strikes, demonstrations, occupations), which may not be correlated and choosing one measure over the other 
may lead to different movements being captured by the definition. Furthermore, there are big discrepancies when 
it comes to the numbers provided by different actors such as the state or the unions.  
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these recent years and it is therefore natural to focus on them. The reason why I specify them 
as reactive is because this may have important consequences for the interpretation of the role 
of allies and the context in general. The effect or mechanism for proactive and reactive 
movements may not be the same. This does not mean that my conclusions only regard such 
events, but the conclusions may not be so easily transferable.  
 
In France such reactive protest movements are quite common and there are accordingly many 
to choose from. Since the beginning of the 80s there have been several movements regarding 
education (1984, 1986, 1995, 2004, 2005, 2009), retirement (1993, 1995, 2003, 2007, 2010), 
working life (1994, 1997-1998, 2006, 2009) and other goals (2005). From these I have 
decided to include four movements. These are the 1995, 2003 and 2010 movements that 
primarily regarded pensions and retirement8 and the 2006 movement against the introduction 
of new working contracts. There are several reasons why I have chosen these movements. 
They were first of all chosen so as to have two cases of “success” and two cases of “failure”, 
especially since I should be careful not to include more movements for fear of losing context 
specificity. Secondly, they needed to be of a substantial size in order to be comparable. 
Thirdly, some of the cases mix demands that make them hard to discern from each other such 
as the 2009 movement. Fourthly, there needed to be data available. For the older movements 
like 1984, 1986, 1993 and 1994 using newspaper data would be much harder since Factivia 
only includes newspapers since 1995. The cases that have been chosen are also some of the 
most well-documented movements in terms of scholarly literature. Using any of the other 
movements could have proved difficult simply because no or little data would be available.  
 
Therefore I am left with four movements that are predominantly similar. My study therefore 
resembles what Mill would call the method of difference and Przeworski and Teune would 
name the Most Similar System Design (George and Bennet 2005: 165). The idea is to keep 
constant all factors but one, which will leave one factor to explain the difference in the 
dependent variable. This is an ideal-type setting and will rarely be found in a political setting. 
It is still a very useful way to think for my study. For example, since the statist aspects of the 
political context are very much the same this will not be a potent variable that I will look at, 
even though the literature indicates its prevalence. The same goes for political culture, party 
                                                 
8 For the 1995 movement, aspects of the 1995 education movement will also be incorporated as the two more or 
less converge after some time 
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system, electoral system, issue salience9 etc. This leaves a more restrained set of factors 
(discussed in the theory chapter) that will explain the differences in outcomes.  
 
3.4 Why protest movements in France? 
 
Why do I focus on French protest movements? I argue that France is a good place to study 
social movement outcomes for several reasons. Firstly, since France is regarded as a strong 
state social movements are unlikely to achieve substantial success by opposing government 
actions in France (Kitschelt 1986). When this still seems to occur it is interesting to see what 
it is that makes this unintended outcome come about. Secondly, as seen before France has had 
many different movements the last years with different outcomes, some are successes and 
others are defeats. Thirdly, France has a high level of mobilization and a history of popular 
contention unlike most countries. French political history is literally littered with contentious 
episodes such as the French Revolution, the commune of Paris in 1871, May 1968 etc. Dalton 
(2008) comparing 21 democracies, finds that France is one of the most contentious countries, 
with 43 % of respondents saying they have participated in a challenging act (lawful 
demonstrations, boycotts, unofficial strikes, occupying a building). It is higher than most 
other big democracies such as Italy with 37 %, the US with 36%, Germany 30%, Great 
Britain 25% and Japan 14%. This provides for an interesting context in which these 
mechanisms are embedded.  
 
Lastly, not much research has been conducted (at least not in English) on such movements in 
France. A few examples still exist, such as Kitschelt (1986), Kriesi (1995), Tilly (1986) and 
Béland and Marier (2006). It is thus a somewhat new but still very rich empirical context 
within which I will seek to answer my research question. This is strengthened by the fact that 
the main bulk of research on social movements (and much other political science research for 
that matter) has been conducted in a North American context (Gerring 2008: 676; Uba 2007). 
Choosing France is therefore a good way of accumulating knowledge regarding movements in 
a somewhat different context. However, this also means that one has to be careful not to draw 
too widespread conclusions and remain cognizant of the fact that what remains true in the 
French context may not be so in other contexts and vice versa.  
 
                                                 
9 All the cases are “high-profile” movements, meaning movements where the issues at hand are the most 
threatening for the authorities (Kriesi et al. 1995b: 103). 
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3.5 Information about data: 
 
Newspapers are my main source of information for this thesis. There are according to Earl et 
al (2004) several possible problems with newspaper data. The first problem relates to what is 
called selection bias. It means that newspapers will not cover all the possible events. In fact 
only a certain amount of events will be covered. Half, according to some (Earl et al. 2004), or 
even less according (2-5%) to others (Fillieule 2007). This need not be a problem since even 
5% of the total events could be representative of the larger population, provided that 
newspapers do not bias their coverage. Research suggests newspapers are attracted to violent 
and big events (Fillieule 2007: 217). This is a serious issue that must be taken into 
consideration in my research. However, it is not of outmost importance for me since I do not 
seek to establish a general account of contention in France but rather focus on four pre-
defined cases. The next problem relates to “description bias”. This means that in the events 
covered by the newspapers there may exist an under- or overestimation of the number of 
participants or injured. Still, such hard facts are mostly reported accurately (Earl et al. 
2004:72). However, soft facts, such as the meaning given to it by the participants or the 
ideology of the movement may be distorted and affected by the political leanings of the 
newspaper or other factors. This appears to be especially true when newspapers base their 
articles on information either from the authorities or organizers (Earl et al. 2004). This is very 
important for me as the meanings given to the mobilization, the surrounding political context, 
the interactions with the government etc, may be biased in some newspapers. One solution 
proposed is to look at several newspapers. Collecting multiple sources means that one gets 
several points of view on contentious issues. In France one would expect for example Le 
Figaro to be very different from l’Humanité or Libération. I therefore include different 
newspapers and will attempt to crosscheck any information that appears controversial.   
 
To find the newspaper articles I used the Dow Jones Factivia news retriever. This contains 
more than 28 500 sources and is updated continuously (Factivia 2011). AFP, Reuters, Le 
Monde, Le Figaro, Libération, L’Humanité, les Echos, Marianne etc. and various local 
newspapers are included in the database. There is thus a high degree of diversity in the 
sources since newspapers such as Libération represent the left-side of the spectrum whereas 
Le Figaro is more rightist in their coverage. In order to capture both the build-up to a 
movement and the aftermath I considered articles 2 years before and after the actual 
movement as relevant in the preliminary search. This means that any article appearing 
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between 2001 and 2005 would be considered as relevant for the 2003 movement. In order to 
capture a wide variety of actions I used the search words grève (strike), manifestation 
(demonstration), occupation (occupation), France and movement social (social movement). In 
total I got over 2000 articles for the whole period. Of these about half were downloaded in 
PDF-format. After closer examination 87 articles were retained for the 1995 movement, 56 
for the 2003 movement, 37 for the 2006 movement and 243 for the 2010 movement. It is 
interesting to note the enormous increase in articles for the 2010 movement. This is partly 
because many smaller newspapers were added only recently to the Factivia database. The 
number of articles for the 2006 movement remains unexplainably small and I will therefore 
for this movement have to rely more on academic sources and organizational reports. As the 
total number of newspaper articles exceeds 400 I will not refer to them in the discussion even 
if they form the basis of much of the timelines, outcome debates etc. However, I will refer to 
them if they bring special, precise or controversial information.  
 
Academic work and organizational reports constitute the rest of my sources. Little research 
has been conducted using the specific theories and concepts that I use in my thesis. I therefore 
have to content with historical and idiosyncratic studies of the movements in question. There 
may be some overrepresentation of “leftist” scholars who identify with different parts of the 
movement. This means that there may be a slight bias. However, I believe this to be a minor 
issue as I do not in any case intend to discuss the legitimacy of either reforms or protest. 
Additionally, whenever possible I try to triangulate with media sources in order to verify 
suspicious claims. Most of the academic sources are in French. Regarding the organizational 
reports some pertain from government agencies such as INSEE, others come from businesses 
like CSA or voluntary associations exemplified by CAJ. All newspaper articles and reports 
are in French. 
 
To summarize I will conduct a multiple case study of four movements with two successes and 
two failures. I aim to generate knowledge on three different levels. 1). The cases in my study. 
2). Protest movements in France. 3). General social movement theory. Regarding the latter 
aspects I hope to elucidate and refine the theories, pointing to links and mechanisms that 
attach independent variables to the dependent ones. For this I will rely heavily on newspaper 
data gathered from French newspapers and scholarly literature on the movements.  
 42
4.0 Analysis of the movements and their political contexts  
 
This chapter contains the analysis of the different movements. In the beginning I will briefly 
discuss French unions and retirement policy, since these are essential in order to understand 
the movements. Following this, for each movement, I will present a timeline, pursued by a 
discussion of the outcome. After that I will explain each outcome by using the variables 
identified in the theory chapter. I will first however, remind the reader of these.   
 
The different variables: 
 
As was seen in the theory chapter there are several variables that have been seen to influence 
a movement’s chances for success. These can be divided in the movement controlled internal 
variables and other external variables that are outside the control of the movement (Amenta 
and Caren 2004; Uba 2007). 
 
Among the internal variables we find the degree of disruption. The higher this is the more the 
movement will be able to threaten central interests of politicians and states, and therefore 
force a favourable outcome for the movement. The size of protests also seems to be positive 
for favourable outcomes as it signals strong contention within society which can ultimately be 
an obstacle to the re-election of politicians in power. Other relevant variables that will be 
looked at are variety (the more varied the more chances for success) and novelty (the more 
novel the more chances for success). Furthermore, I will consider the degree of 
factionalization both between SMOs and within them. The more factionalized the SMOs are, 
the smaller chance a movement has to succeed. 
 
Among the external variables I will focus on the presence of allies, especially political parties. 
It is thought that such allies facilitate favourable outcomes. This is especially true if allies can 
be found among the decision-makers. Secondly I focus on the relevance of public opinion. It 
is believed that the stronger support the movement has within the public the harder it will be 
for the government to oppose the wishes and demands of the movement. Another issue is 
whether public opinion is moving. If a movement gets more popular it is a sign of increasing 
conscience of the demands in society. Should it decrease it indicates that the movement is 
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losing the public and nearing defeat. As for the specific political structures these do not wary 
much, and will therefore not be discussed at length.  
 
In addition I will focus on the tactics employed by the government to withhold the movement 
and keep it by influencing decisions of the state. This has been conceptualized as a set of 
protest avoidance tactics by Béland and Marier (2006). I will therefore look for signs that the 
government actively tried to stop both mobilization and the influence of movements. 
Following the lessons from the political mediation approach I keep track of the interactions 
between variables, even though they are separated under distinct headlines. 
 
I will now present two important factors in my thesis. First of all I will present a quick outline 
of French trade unions. These play an important role in most of the movements and can as 
such be considered as the SMOs. Secondly, I present how the pension system has evolved. 
This is because three out of my four movements came about after an unpopular pension 
reform. It is therefore important to have some background knowledge of this before analysing 
the movements.  
 
4.1 Trade unions in France 
 
There are numerous trade unions in France. Five confederations of trade unions are 
recognized as social partners and representatives at the national level. These are: CFDT 
(Confédération française démocratique du travail), CGT (Confédération générale du travail), 
FO (Force Ovrière), CFTC (Conféderation française des travailleurs chrétiens) and CFE-CGC 
(Conféderation française de l’encadrement – Conféderation générale des cadres). Other 
unions include G-10 (Groupe des dix), UNSA (Union nationale des syndicats autonomes),  
FSU (Féderation syndicale unitaire) and the many unions united under the name SUD (Union 
syndicale Solidaires) (Crettiez and Sommier 2002). Unions were forbidden under the La 
Chapelier law of 1791, but legalized in 1884 (Shorter and Tilly 1974). The CGT was created 
in 1895 and confirmed in 1906, in the Amiens Charter, its independence from political parties 
and the state. During the 20s-30s an important split developed between socialist and 
communist unions. This was further established when FO departed from the CGT in 1948, 
due to controversies regarding the Marshall-programme and the relationship with the Soviet 
Union. FO went in a more reformist way than CGT. During the after-war period the 
fractionalization has become even more important and many of the above mentioned unions 
 44
appeared due to internal disputes that resulted in subsequent splits in older trade unions. The 
competition between unions has also been maintained very high by two other factors. One is 
the existence of so-called professional elections, which pits different unions against each other 
to become delegates of the workers and members of the firm committees. This is often used in 
order to show how well a union represents workers. There is low turn-out, but it still creates 
clear competition between trade unions. The second is declining levels of union-membership. 
In fact only 9 % of workers were member of a union in 2003, and CGT, the oldest union, lost 
over two thirds of its members between 1976 and 2003 (Sommier 2003:39-41). This number 
is decreasing and unions are fighting to attract new members. There is thus often much 
contention between unions. That contention is a regular trait between unions is evident in the 
general movement literature which claims that the “need to compete for organizational 
resources, establish distinct niches, and claim exclusive credit for victories create barriers to 
inter-organizational collaboration” (Krinsky and Reese 2006: 630).  
 
A majority of protest events in France are connected to so-called old social movements, 
whereas in other countries such as the Netherlands, Germany or Switzerland, New Social 
Movements account for a higher percentage (Kriesi et al. 1995: 19) This is according to Kriesi 
et al. (1995) linked to the fact that labour relations have not been pacified and institutionalized 
to the same extent in France as in the other countries. As trade such unions play an integral 
part in protest in France. In the timeline of the movement and the following analysis I will 
especially focus on the CGT, CFDT, and FO and less frequently the others. These will be 
analyzed as any other SMO in its role in mobilizing people.  
 
4.2 Pension system in France 
 
The modern French pension system, which remains a highly contentious topic in France, dates 
back to the immediate world-war II aftermath. The state wanted to put in place a universalized 
pension system. This was however opposed by the CGT who saw it as an attempt to appease 
the population and therefore as a threat to their revolutionary goals (Crettiez and Sommier 
2002). Several special regimes (“regimes speciaux”) which mostly concern workers in certain 
big state-owned companies were thus put in place, and trade unions were placed on 
managerial boards in order to supervise the pensions and select staff. Around the year 2000 
some 122 special regimes, which covered 20% of the working population, existed (Béland 
and Hansen 2000: 52). After 1967 representatives of the employers make up 50% of these 
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boards. Even though it was still the National Assembly that fixed pensions etc., unions 
remained attached to its importance in the management of pensions and social security. 
People were in fact making a direct contribution to a “solidarity fund” for the financing of 
health care and retirements. This fund was independent of parliamentary majorities and the 
budgets they would enact (Bensaïd 1996:111). Pensions were raised in 1971 from 40% to 
50% and in 1982, the newly elected Socialist Prime Minister Francois Mitterand decreased 
the retirement age from 65 to 60. During the 80s and 90s there was a growing consensus 
among political elites that something had to be done with the pension system because of 
increasing economic difficulties. Several reports were issued and their conclusions were 
mostly the same: pensions should be less generous and people must work for a longer period 
of time (Béland 2001: 164). These reports were however not put in place due mainly to the 
electoral risks it would involve introducing the reform. In 1993, right after the sweeping 
victory of the right, Balladur, the new rightist Prime Minister engaged in discussions with the 
unions in order to implement some of the propositions that had appeared in earlier reports. 
Unions were able to obtain a strict separation of contributory and non-contributory benefits, 
which meant they would keep the upper hand on pensions in the future. The unions then more 
or less supported the reform, which touched mostly the “regime general”. It brought the years 
needed to reach full entitlement to 40 years; the average on which pensions would be made 
was extended to 25 years instead of 10; the indexation of pensions would be shifted from 
prices to wages (Béland 2001:164).  
 
In 1995 the government tried to extend this to the “regime speciaux” without luck, as we shall 
see below. In 2003 the private sector saw the years needed to reach full entitlement increased 
to 41 years, whereas functionaries would have to contribute at least 40 years. The last major 
reform came in 2010. It entailed an increase in the number of years one had to have worked 
from 41 to 41.5 in order to obtain full pension. It furthermore gradually increased from 60 to 
62 years the age at which a person, having contributed the years necessary, could become a 
pensioner with full pension. For those that had not contributed 41.5 years, full pension age 
was pushed from 65 to 67. These three reforms (1995, 2003 and 2010) generated popular 
protest movements, mobilizing broad segments of society and constitute three of my four 
cases.   
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I now turn to explaining the four cases. As there are many dates and it can be quite confusing, 
table 1 provides a summary of the movements and the most important dates. Start date refers 
to when the movement started. The reason why n/a is prominent for the 1995 movement is 
that the protests kept the main part of the reform from entering the parliament. In 2006 the 
movement managed to repel the reform after it was promulgated. 
 
Table 1: Overview of movements 
 
4.3 Movement of 1995 
 
Some authors, like Touraine (1996), have contended that it is not a proper social movement 
since it lacks concrete plans for how society should be run. The movement in 1995 did not 
propose any changes to society; it was merely a refusal of the type of society that was 
proposed by the state. Furthermore this did not produce any durable effects, and it lacked 
programmatic capacity (Touraine 1996:48-50). This may seem plausible since the pension 
reform that this refused was carried out in 2003 and 2010. However, following the definition 
presented in the introduction, this and the other cases are clearly social movements. They act 
outside of regular channels in order to challenge the government’s planned reform. As such 
they qualify to be understood as proper movements. Other authors, such as Waters (2003) and 
Della Porta and Diani (2006: 33-35) have also qualified this as a social movement. This 
preliminary remark regards all of the movements in the thesis.  
Movement 1995 2003 2006 2010 
Start date 15th November 13th May 16th January 15th February 
Start debate in 
Parliament 
n/a 10th June 31st January 7th 
September 
Constitutional council 
appealed to 
 
n/a 18th July 1st March 2nd 
November 
Promulgation date n/a 22nd August 31st March 9th 
November 
President Jacques Chirac Jacques Chirac Jacques Chirac Nicolas 
Sarkozy 
Prime Minister Alain Juppé Jean-Pierre 
Raffarin 
Dominique de 
Villepin 
Francois 
Fillon 
Most prominent role in 
contention played by 
 
Railroad 
workers 
Education 
personnel 
Students Refineries 
Outcome Success Failure Success Failure 
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4.3.1 Timeline  
 
It is important to give a brief account of the political context at the time of the movement. 
Jacques Chirac was elected President in 1995 on a generous campaign stressing the fight 
against unemployment and social insecurity (Howard 1996: 249) He placed himself primarily 
in the centre and beat his socialist opponent, Lionel Jospin in the second round with a score of 
52.6 percent the 7th of May 1995. Alain Juppé was then appointed Prime Minister. It quickly 
became clear that the new leaders in place had changed priorities and called for strong 
austerity measures so that inflation and debt could be reduced in order to meet the difficult 
criterions for adhering to the new European Monetary Union. In fact, the social security 
deficit amounted to 62 billion francs in 1995, whereas the total budget deficit was 345 billion 
francs (Howard 1996: 248). The first measure to be enacted was the freeze in pay of public 
officials. The main plan, which had been conceived of in secret by the Prime Minister and 
certain of his collaborators, was announced November 15th by the Prime Minister. This 
included a raise in social charges, bigger contributions to pension funds and in health related 
matters and the infamous increase in the number of years that a person had to have worked in 
order to obtain full retirement. This increase would mean that public employees would have to 
work 40 instead of 37.5 years, which would bring them on the same level as private 
employees, who had seen the contribution years increase to 40 in 1993. This was thus an 
effort to harmonize the special regimes with the general regime (Béland 2001). The 
government also wanted to take some of the management powers of the unions away by each 
year deciding on a budget for health insurance spending. This was by many unions seen as a 
stab in the back, since the measure had been introduced so hastily and there had been no 
indications that pensions would be touched (Lindvall 2011). It led to a general uproar in 
society that materialized in numerous contentious events in the weeks to follow, to which I 
turn now.  
 
Already in October students at the University of Rouen went on strike to demand better 
universities, more professors and bigger budgets. In several provincial universities, strikes and 
occupations took place during the end of October and beginning of November. Toulouse, 
Metz and other universities were at times completely blocked. The minister of Education, 
François Bayrou, tried reasoning with the universities by announcing more money to the 
poorest universities (Reuters 1995b). This did not appease the students who continued their 
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strikes. However, it was not until Juppé announced his retirement plan that things really 
started stirring. The underlying grievances relating to a fear for the future could be felt 
throughout the country (Bensaïd 1996; Touraine 1996). The “Juppé-reform” was a catalyst for 
much of these grievances. In many ways it was an opportunity for people to vent their fears 
and frustrations. It triggered social networks and different collective identities into action 
around common themes and a common “enemy”. In addition, the SNCF announced that they 
planned closing several local train lines. All seven unions representing public agents called 
for a strike November 24th. This day almost 500 000 people, according to the government and 
many more according to the unions, took to the streets in order to demonstrate. During the 
following days the RATP (Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens) entered the movement. 
The 1st of December both the CGT and FO called for a generalization of the public official 
strike. The next days strikes continued in the public sector with 40 % of both SNCF and 
RATP on strike, and 90% of drivers in both companies refusing to work (Touraine 1996: 
311). Half of all post-offices were blocked. The strike also touched airports, buses and 
electricity. The following day between 500 000 and 800 000 people demonstrated all around 
the country. The Prime Minister launched meetings with industry officials in order to improve 
the plan. Simultaneously the Socialist party started to enter more fiercely on the stage by 
supporting the movement actively and asking for the complete withdrawal of the plan. A 
number of other allies appeared when 500 intellectuals signed a petition in Le Monde 
supporting the workers. December 7th the most contentious day of the movement followed 
with more than 1 million people in the streets. In Paris, however, there were only 16 000. This 
had not been the case in past mobilizations such as in 1968, when most events took place in 
Paris. The degree to which the whole country was involved in the movement is evidence of a 
decentralization of contention and especially of demonstrations (Fillieule and Tartakowsky 
2008). The next day leaders of the SNCF announced that they would postpone signing the 
contract plan at least a week. The tenth of December Mr Juppé announced, on national 
television, that they would not align the two different regimes, and that the pension age would 
not be changed. He also announced his intention to hold a social summit discussing with 
social partners various measures that should be taken. The unions seemed dubious to this 
announcement, but recognized that an opening to negotiation was good.  
 
There would still be several big demonstrations in the days to follow. Especially the 12th big 
demonstrations were held in the whole country regrouping around two million people 
according to the unions. The unions, especially CGT and FO kept up the pressure in order to 
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influence the government further on issues pertaining to social security in general. The unions 
also feared that the authorities would not be true to their words and demanded to have written 
guarantees by the government. The last big day of demonstrations came the 16th as more than 
a million people, according to the organizers, and 586 000 according to the government went 
in the streets. The 21st of December different actors met for a national social summit. The 
Prime Minister and eight other ministers met with numerous employers unions and trade 
unions, including the CGT, FO and CFDT. Together they agreed on several measures 
including policy promising to incite youth employment, and other employment friendly 
measures. Both the CGT and FO seemed unhappy with the measures of the summit, whereas 
CFDT and CFTC were content especially with the measures on youth employment (Touraine 
1996: 315).  
 
4.3.2 The outcome 
 
Authors have disagreed regarding the level of success of the movement. According to 
Touraine (1996) the movement was a relative success in the way that the most contentious 
part of the Juppé project, namely the reform of the pension-system, was withdrawn December 
10th. However, cuts were still conducted and the movement could not “give the country a new 
course”. The social security reform was still enacted and the unions were not able to secure a 
continued and full role in future negotiations. Others again claim this as one of the big 
exploits of the left in the new liberalized Europe. Filoche (2004) for example names the 1995 
movement in the same sentence as 1968. Also Trat (1996) seems to give a positive assessment 
of the outcomes of the movement, also referring to the fact that many “cheminots” for 
example found an increased focus on their cause, and that their identity was finally 
recognized. This is what may be described as an internal impact, and even though it is not the 
main focus of this study, it should not be ignored.  
 
There is thus a certain controversy regarding the actual results of this movement. Was it a 
success? If yes, how big a success? First we have to think about the movement’s goals. It is 
clear that the movement’s most pressing goal was the withdrawal of the policy on pensions. 
The leader of CGT, Bernard Thibault for example exclaimed the 6th of December that “what 
we want is the withdrawal of the Juppé plan and renegotiating the contract of the plan after a 
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national debate has been organized”10 (in Béroud and Mouriaux 1997: 92-93). They also 
wished to prevent the implementation of certain social security measures and secure the rights 
to negotiate. In the most radical moments they wished to completely change the way society 
works and get a more equal France. What we see is a mix of proactive and reactive goals. 
Proactive here entails the possibility of securing higher benefits for its constituents in the 
future, meaning the introduction of new advantages. It is also a claim that would be 
considered a high level of success if it were realized (Amenta and Young 1999). The other 
claims are reactive, meaning that they involve preventing the implementation of new 
disadvantages. These are clearly mid-level claims that therefore involve mid-level successes, 
which would mean benefits stay the same for an indefinite period of time, but that they are 
subject to change. In other words, the reform was postponed, for an indefinite but not infinite 
period of time.  
 
The main parts of the movement can be said to be a moderate success. They obtained the 
withdrawal of the pension reform, which was their prime target, as well as minor successes 
regarding youth employment, which received one time subventions. At the same time the 
movement’s most radical claims regarding a re-structuring of society and relations between 
labour and capital were not put in place. Although the existing society was put into question, 
the movement never managed to capitalize on this and present its vision of society. It is 
therefore safe to say that this was a moderate success for the main parts of the movement. 
Also the students in the movement achieved minor success through subventions and increased 
budgets. Their core goals were met, but nothing more than that.  
 
4.3.3 The question of causation  
 
One big question remains before explaining how this success came about, and that is whether 
it is plausible that the movement lead to this outcome. In other words, would the outcome 
have been the same without the movement? This is a question of extreme importance in the 
study of outcomes of protest and social movements. There is no clear-cut answer to whether 
movements in general are effective. Amenta et al (2010) going through numerous journal 
articles, found that a slight majority of them concluded that movements are efficient. Earlier 
scholars have noted that protest is rational only inasmuch as it can achieve favourable 
                                                 
10 All French quotations have been translated by the author 
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outcomes (Burstein et al. 1995). When looking at this movement it seems appropriate to first 
of all note that the movement did not go unseen. The countless demonstrations, strikes, 
economic costs and petitions were felt by the authorities. Alain Juppé announced on national 
television that he understood the French, and their feeling of fear (Le Monde 1996a). It is 
improbable that the outcome would have been the same in the absence of such an assertive 
movement, especially when considering who could have influenced the government if not the 
movement. Already the whole government seemed unified, so did the deputies of the right. 
Cracks did emerge, however, these were in response to the movement and would not have 
done so in its absence (Reuters 1995f). Furthermore, the social actors that could be capable of 
convincing the government of changing were in the streets. It is thus safe to say that it is 
because of the movement that this outcome came about. It is not spurious and cannot be 
attributed to outside factors, especially since external, foreign factors were largely positive to 
the reform such as the EU and Germany (Béroud and Mouriaux 1997). Indeed, it seems fairly 
obvious that the movement had an impact. This may be because it was a reactive movement. 
In a proactive movement one must also include the possibility that a given outcome came 
about due to the preferences of the policy-makers, independent of the mobilization. However, 
as in this case the authorities are per definition hostile towards the movement’s goals this 
seems like a very implausible explanation. 
 
4.3.4 Why did the 1995 movement succeed? 
 
I now turn to explaining the reasons why the movement succeeded in 1995. I will first assess 
the internal variables meaning the various tactics employed and the actors. Afterwards I will 
focus on the role external actors played such as allies and public opinion.  
 
Internal variables  
 
Disruption and size of the movement 
 
I start off by identifying the actions of the movement itself. The disruption of society was very 
heavy. Disruption is here understood as economic and property damage as well as 
infringement on social mobility. In fact trains, buses and metros were all blocked, and heavy 
traffic jams kept people from being able to travel freely. Indeed, November 29th, traffic jams 
 52
were over 500 kilometres long in Paris (Reuters 1995e). The economic costs were also 
substantial. SNCF alone lost over 100 million francs per day of strike, whereas the national 
Post-company lost in total over 1 billion francs during the protest movement (Le Monde 
1996b). The total costs of the movement is said to have taken away between 0.2%-0.3% 
percentage points of economic growth in 1995 (INSEE 2003, 2007). This shows the immense 
costs the protest movement was putting on the country, and why the politicians had to figure 
out a way to get out of this deadlock. Also in other sectors the disruption was taking a toll on 
consumers and politicians alike. One such example is the energy sector where the state owned 
electricity company EDF had to cut production of electricity from 52 000 megawatt to 18 000 
megawatt (Reuters 1995d). This forced the state to import much electricity from foreign 
countries and thus increased costs for French citizens. In terms of violence the movement was 
quite peaceful, and although heated debates took place, relatively few were injured. Notable 
exceptions exist however, as with the example of the 25 miners in Lorraine who were injured 
December 7th and 8th. The disruption can be conceived of as negative inducements, using the 
terms of Piven and Cloward (1977), that has proved to be important for several different 
movements. In this sense the movement managed to deprive the elite of something in their 
interest, which in this case could especially be economic and social stability. The threatening 
mechanism thus seems to be very potent. This remains particularly valid since the reasons for 
the reform were exactly a growing economic deficit. The threatening mechanism thus seems 
to be very strong. 
 
The number of strikers was also very high. According to official statistics almost 6 000 000 
workdays were lost due to strikes in 1995, compared to 1 million in 1994 and 1996. The 
public sector was responsible for approximately 2/3 of the strike days (Groux and Pernot 
2008: 87). During the first few days of December around 40 % of both SNCF and RATP were 
on strike, and 90% of drivers in both companies refused to work. During the fourth trimester 
of 1995 railway transportations were down by 25%, whereas personal road transport was 
down 2.8%. Household consummation of transports during this period was down 4% (INSEE 
2007). Although these numbers may not seem that impressive, it is important to remember 
that this takes into account the three months in total, whereas the movement did not start 
catching ground until the middle of November. This blocked the country at a remarkable 
scale. In response to this the government tried to organize a counter-movement basing 
themselves on users of public transportations. Only 1000 people showed up and it was heavily 
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denounced on the front-page of Le Monde (Le Monde 1995b). This is also an indication of 
how much the government feared that this would continue. 
 
When it comes to the demonstrations conducted by the movement these were at times 
enormous. As can be seen from table 1 the 4th and 7th of December gathered 800 000 and 
1 000 000 people to protest the reform according to the unions. The most impressive display 
of power came the 12th of December with over 2 000 000 demonstrating in the whole of 
France. These are powerful signs to the government of the unpopularity of reform. This is one 
of three ways in which a movement can influence an outcome, namely by making the 
authorities aware of the preferences of society (Burstein 1999: 12-17). The demonstrations 
were in fact the biggest since the ones taking place in May 1968 (Touraine 1996). Both 
demonstrations and strikes point to a very interesting aspect, namely the importance of size. 
Without so many people in the streets and on strike the movement would not have been able 
to disrupt society as much as they did. This also helped attracting media attention which again 
made it harder for the government to ignore and withstand the enormous pressure.  
 
Figure 1: Main demonstrations 1995 movement  
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Source: Touraine (1996) 
 
By its strong mobilization throughout the country the movement managed first of all to prove 
its power and the fact that they were able to block the country. This could be a serious threat 
to security and economy. As such the threatening mechanism identified in the literature 
review seems to be playing an important role. Its long duration was also a sign of resilience, 
 54
and signalled that the consequences of the movement could be even bigger. The government 
understood that if they were to force this reform through they would risk blocking the country 
even more. These conclusions seem to give credit to Piven and Cloward (1977) who claim 
that in order for a movement to obtain concessions from elites it has to be disruptive and 
impose negative inducements on the government. This also indicates that both threatening and 
signalling mechanisms played a role accounting for the outcome.  
 
Characteristics of the movement   
 
When it comes to the other tactical variables it is difficult to find any clear effect. There was 
little novelty involved in the different protest actions. Both strikes and demonstrations have 
been used since the middle of the 19th century and are among the most common ways of 
showing ones discontent both in France and elsewhere (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1986). Regarding 
the variety of means, strikes and demonstrations were by far the most used protest actions. 
Some occupations took place such as when strikers from Air France occupied the landing 
strips at the Orly airport the 30th of November, but it was not a very predominant tactic 
(Reuters 1995d).   
 
Social Movement Organizations 
 
Defining the actions of the movement is important, but just as important are the actors behind 
these actions. The main actors of the movement are the unions. These can be labelled as 
diverse SMOs as was identified by McCarthy and Zald (1977). An important variable is the 
degree of unity between the unions and the way they coordinate and manage to provide 
coherent framing and demands.  
 
When it comes to the 1995 movement the unions were fairly coherent, especially in the 
beginning. The unions were all critical towards the reform and they seemed to stand strong 
against the government. Much would change when the leader of the CFDT, Nicole Notat, 
announced that she was favourable to a reform. This was taken as clear support for the 
government, although she later claimed this was just a recognition that something had to be 
done with the pension system. She was booed at during demonstrations and faced much 
internal opposition. For example, CFDT in the railway sector called for continuing the strikes 
along with FO and CGT (Reuters 1995e). The CFDT also participated in most of the joint 
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efforts such as demonstrations, reunions and summits. FO and CGT proved to be good 
partners during the whole campaign. The leaders even shook hands during one of the earlier 
demonstrations (Reuters 1995f). The fact that these two unions which traditionally have been 
opposed on so many issues managed to find common ground, gave strength to the movement 
and meant they could continue their actions over a long period of time. The union between the 
two former enemies, formerly divided over the communist heritage, is often cited to be a 
reason for the success of the movement (Béland and Marier 2006). 
 
There was thus a certain tendency of factionalization between the unions. However, this was 
by no means a big factionalization since two of the biggest unions stayed united, and 
moreover the government did not capitalize on this in order to break them further by offering 
selective concessions.  
 
External variables: 
 
I here refer to the external factors such as allies, public opinion or strategies by authorities that 
may increase or decrease the chances for success for a movement.  
 
Allies  
 
I turn first to the allies. The obvious allies of this movement were the political parties of the 
left, mainly the communist party (PC) and the socialist party (PS). The PS was strong in its 
criticism of the actions of the government and called repeatedly for the opening of 
negotiations. The party also participated in demonstrations, but remained careful not to 
actively call for demonstrations, as the PS did not want to be substituted for the unions 
(Touraine 1996: 308). The socialist party was also very careful not to call for either the 
resignation of Alain Juppé or the outright withdrawal of the plan. This is linked to the internal 
divisions of the socialist party, and especially the division between its “culture of 
government” maintained during the Mitterrand years, and its “culture of opposition” which it 
nurtured before 1981. The PS leader, Lionel Jospin, continuously expressed his support for 
the movement, but tried keep his party from becoming a “counter-government”. It was an 
effort not to repeat the mistakes of Mitterrand in 1968 where he had stated that he was ready 
to take over power after de Gaulle. This was a contributing factor to the dismal results for 
Mitterrand’s party in the following legislative elections (Dogan 1984; Rotman 2008). Taking 
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up this role would probably not have been accepted in the party as certain parts of the reform 
had been proposed up to several times by earlier socialist governments (Béland 2001: 164). A 
strong anti-reform stand could therefore be conceived as negative and hypocritical. Another 
crucial factor was that the Socialist party knew that they had the possibility of finding 
themselves in government already a few years after this. It might then have to make 
unpopular decisions regarding social security and the pension system. It would in that case be 
hard to seem credible. The PS was therefore torn between a wish to support the movement 
and therefore hope to gain support and a fear of ending up in a situation where they would 
seem to go back on promises and support made to the movement.  The PC on the other hand 
was more expressive in their support since it had no real hopes of coming in a governing 
position any time soon. This meant that they could give their outright support to the 
movement. They called more precisely for the complete withdrawal of the reform and Alain 
Bocquet, a PC deputy, for example said that the communist group supports “massively the 
railway-workers because they are right” (Reuters 1995c). 
 
The 18th, when the social security bill was to be voted, communists and socialists tried to 
block and oppose the bill. They called for the suspension of the debate several times and 
interfered several times with points of order. This was however not fruitful, and as seen before 
the final parts of the social security reform were passed. The opposition therefore seems to 
have played a minor role in the middle success that the movement obtained. The support and 
solidarity with the movement is substantial. However, the success was obtained without any 
considerable help from the PS and PC, and when they could have helped the movement, the 
opposition failed to do so. This suggests that allies, at least non-decision-making ones, may 
not be very important. Indeed, allies are present, but this does not necessarily translate into 
increased influence. 
 
There were some notable extra-institutional allies. These included several intellectuals who 
the 5th of December launched a petition in support of the social movement and denounced the 
Juppé plan11. The most noteworthy person on this list is without a doubt the sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu (Le Monde 1995a). Bourdieu held a famous speech to railway workers in Lyon the 
12th where he announced that “I am here to give you our support…”. When Bourdieu held his 
speech it seemed to incite the workers and make them believe that the fight could be won. It 
                                                 
11 It was also a counter response to the petition initiated by the magazine Esprit November 24th in support of 
Nicole Notat of CFDT.   
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was also a clear signal to the government when personalities like this expressed such strong 
views against the reform. However, one should not put too much into this. Around 500 
intellectuals signed the petition and it is improbable that this had any effect on the final result. 
This is all the more probable since neither Juppé nor the government mentioned the petition or 
any of its participants at any point in time.  
 
Public Opinion 
 
Another very important variable identified in the existing theories is public opinion. It is said 
to mediate the direct actions of a movement, and having a favourable public opinion is 
essential for a movement to obtain desirable outcomes.  
 
Figure 2: Degree of support 1995 movement 
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Source: CSA (2004) 
 
The evolution of public opinion on the movement can be seen in figure 2 above. I base myself 
on data gathered by CSA, a public opinion group that has conducted extensive public opinion 
polls on contemporary issues, including social movements, since the 1980s (CSA 2011). The 
attitudes towards the protest movement are fairly stable, but a slight upwards trend may be 
said to exist. The movement does seem to become more popular as the strikes and 
demonstrations gain in importance. It is also interesting to note that the movement is favoured 
by at least 50% of the population. This is not unique for social movements in France. In fact, 
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most contemporary movements regularly gather around 50% of support and sympathy. When 
looking at the data from CSA one notices that only 5 of the 49 polls on social movements 
show less than 50% support for the movement in question (CSA 2004). What seems special 
about 1995 is the fact that public support increases as the movement develops, meaning that 
even though transportations are blocked, which creates big problems for regular citizens, the 
movement still enjoys a high legitimacy. Although one cannot rule out other factors, it might 
be that the movement influenced the preferences of the public by opposing the government, 
appearing on television and presenting arguments regarding the perceived unfairness of the 
reform. This is the second mechanism by which movements may achieve a favourable 
outcome according to Burstein (1999).  
  
The coupling of strong disruption with a highly favourable public opinion gave a very strong 
message to the government and signalled increasing opposition, which corresponds with the 
first of Burstein’s (1999) three mechanisms. The movement seems to have modified the terms 
of the debate among politicians and citizens and as such made politicians more aware of the 
contention in society (Le Monde 1995c). It also gave rise to a new concept widely used in the 
media world, also in relation to many precedent similar movements, namely “grève par 
procuration” (Le Monde 2010b; Les Echos 2003b). This can roughly be translated by proxy 
strike, which means that the strikers represent large parts of the population who are not 
striking for various reasons12 (Groux and Pernot 2008: 138-139). There was a feeling that the 
strikers represented something more than their own interests. The support that the strikers felt 
also gave them incentives to continue striking, and the solidarity expressed by bystanders was 
a contributing factor to the longevity of the movement. The proxy strike coupled with strong 
public sympathy can be seen as a contributing factor to the success of the movement 
(Touraine 1996).  
 
Authorities  
 
Apart from the reform itself, it was the manner in which the authorities introduced the reform 
proposal that caused the most uproar. In fact, during his campaign, presidential candidate 
Jacques Chirac had stated that he would fight the “fracture sociale” in France. It therefore 
came as a big surprise when he announced that he would reform the pension system. This fact 
                                                 
12 In the private sector for example fears of losing salary and/or jobs may keep people from striking. 
 59
was heavily denounced by the unions (Reuters 1995a). That this incoherence contributed to 
the rage of the people has been highlighted by others (Touraine 1996). The strategy of the 
government against the movement can best be described as lacking. There is some evidence 
of framing the reform as necessary. This is part of the protest avoidance tactics identified by 
Béland and Marier (2006). Numerous times Alain Juppé stated that the reform was highly 
needed in order for France to join the Euro-collaboration. Also Jacques Chirac expressed 
concerns that if this reform did not go through France’s relationship with the EU could be 
jeopardized. However, this framing was not excessive and is not more than one would expect 
in such a situation. 
 
To summarize 
 
The success of the 1995 movement seems to be the consequence of the actions of the 
movement in itself together with a favourable public opinion. This lends support to the joint 
effect model. The movement was encouraged by allies both in political parties and among 
intellectuals, however this support was only symbolical. Moreover where the opposition could 
have played a role and increased the level of success of the movement by opposing the 
government’s vote, it failed. This downplays the role played by allies which may seem to be a 
contradiction according to former theories. However, it is important to remember that this is a 
reactive movement, appearing in opposition to the government. It is therefore very hard for 
allies to influence the preferences of the majority. Additionally it has already been noted that 
while parties in opposition may be more inclined to be allied with movements, they are less 
able to provide concessions (Kriesi 1995).  
 
4.4 The movement of 2003  
 
I will here first present a short timeline of the movement of 2003 before I discuss the reasons 
why one can consider that it failed to reach its stated demands.  
 
4.4.1 Timeline 
 
Jacques Chirac, won a resounding victory in the shock election of 2002 with the record-score 
of 82,2% of the votes. This surge in votes for Chirac was because he faced the controversial 
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candidate, Jean-Marie le Pen, from the extreme right-wing party Front National. The result 
secured Chirac a high legitimacy, an argument which he would later use to legitimate reforms. 
The presidential debate had been more right wing than before the 1995 election, and focused 
more on themes such as security and austerity (Miguet 2002). This was a window of 
opportunity for pension retrenchment both because of the strong election victory in 2002 and 
because of the focus on conservative policies in the presidential campaign.  
 
In April the government met to discuss a possible pension reform. The draft produced by 
these discussions excluded touching the “regimes speciaux” as it had been much contested 
during the 1995 movement. Bringing public contribution years to 40 and private contribution 
years to 41 was however one of the prime measures. Appearing on national television the 
Minister of Social Affairs claimed that a reform was the only possible answer to the difficult 
times that France was going through. The unions responded in a unitary fashion expressing 
their discontent with the planned reform. Some, such as the CGT and FO, demanded an 
outright withdrawal of the reform, whereas, CFDT and CFE-CGC favoured negotiations. May 
13th the movement organized massive strikes and demonstrations. During this “day of action” 
many teachers joined the movement against the reform (Béland and Marier 2006). National 
education was already engaged in a strong mobilization against the government’s plans of 
decentralization which would entail that the responsibility for around 100 000 teachers would 
be transferred to departments or regions. This was seen as trying to dismantle national 
education. As these two mobilizations converged the day of action proved very contentious 
with almost 60% of public workers being on strike and between 1 and 2 million people 
demonstrating in the streets everywhere in France. This frightened the government which 
quickly engaged in negotiations with the two most reform friendly unions mentioned above. 
These obtained certain concessions such as higher minimum pensions, adjustments above 
inflation, and full pensions to young workers having had a long career. Thus the two unions 
announced their support for the project whereas the CFTC refrained from further opposition 
(Béroud and Mouriaux 2004: 70).  
 
This was a heavy hit to the protest potential of the movement. Nevertheless they managed to 
mobilize the 25th with several hundred thousands in Paris alone and also the 3rd of June when 
between 450 000 and 1,5 million citizens demonstrated. The strikes, however, were less 
encompassing and the movement did not manage to block the country in the same way and 
hurt important strategic or economic interests. A very interesting event occurred the 15th of 
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June. Around 30 000 people demonstrated in the streets of Paris in favour of the reform and 
against the demonstrations. This surprising march was organized by committees of public 
transport users (Le Figaro 2003). They claimed representing the silent majority, and were an 
important support for the government. June 19th the movement against pension reform 
mobilized again, however only 320 900 joined in the demonstrations according to the unions. 
At the same time socialists in the parliament tried to oppose the movement, stalling debates 
by proposing countless amendments. Due to the summer holidays the movement lost all its 
momentum, and only sporadic demonstration occurred during the month to come. The long-
lasting debates and amendments did postpone the voting of the bill. However, the reform was 
finally voted the 24th of July. The opposition appealed to the Constitutional Council arguing 
that it was against the constitution. August 22nd the Council announced that the law did not 
breach the constitution and could therefore be promulgated.  
 
4.4.2 The outcome 
 
In this case there seems to be an evolution of the goals of the movement. There is a strong 
denunciation of the reform, from all parts of the movement. A complete withdrawal of the 
reform is however only pronounced by the most radical parts, whereas reformist unions such 
as the CFDT and the CFE-CGC demand negotiations on the content of the reform. The first 
statement, signed by all unions, demanded the withdrawal of the reform, but also the need to 
make changes to the existing system (Béroud and Mouraux 2004: 58). As time passed and the 
two reformist unions were approached by the government their goals changed to providing for 
their members. The other parts of the movement continued demanding the complete 
withdrawal of the reform.  
 
Establishing the outcome of this movement proves more difficult than for the other 
movements. For parts of the movement this was a resounding defeat. They obtained some 
concessions, but overall their prime goal was never attained. For the other parts of the 
movement this is slightly different. Providing for their members seemed to become more 
important than the withdrawal of the reform. As such they did obtain some concessions that 
seemed to please at least the leaders of the unions. However, their initial demand was not a 
success. As Béroud and Mouriaux (2004: 59) point out, the text only contained five small 
corrections. Having said this I still refer to this movement as a failure in general because the 
movement’s initial goals were not fulfilled. The “intersyndicale” had clearly stated that they 
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wanted the alignment of the two regimes withdrawn, and when this was not met it is clear that 
it was a failure. This is further strengthened by the fact that the following years CFDT lost 
around 80 000 members, indicating that rank and file were not happy with the decisions of the 
leadership (Le Monde Diplomatique 2010).  
 
4.4.3 Why did the 2003 movement fail? 
 
Although the 2003 and 2010 movements are different from the other movements in the way 
that they did not obtain a favourable outcome, they will still be analyzed in the same way. 
First I will assess the direct actions of the movement. Secondly I will concentrate on allies, 
public opinion and the role of authorities. 
 
Internal variables 
 
Disruption and size of the movement 
 
The disruption of society was fairly extensive. There were numerous strikes and big 
demonstrations throughout the country. The strikes were primarily organized in the field of 
transportation, but also within education. The 13th of May for example 62% of the SNCF and 
90% of RATP were on strike (Béroud and Mouriaux 2004: 58; La Tribune 2003). This caused 
most buses, trains and metros to be blocked. In national education the numbers were just as 
impressive. 65% of all high school personnel refused to work this day. Both regarding SNCF 
and education the mobilization was stronger than during the 1995 movement. The strong 
mobilization however, dwindled as time passed and summer approached. Following the 
announcement of the CFDT that they supported the reform there were only half as many 
people striking the 3rd of June compared to the 13th May (Béland and Marier 2006: 306). 
There was a lack of continuity in the movement. This downward trend proved to the 
government that it could win.  
 
When looking at official statistics one sees that approximately 4.5 million work days were lost 
due to strikes in 2003 (Groux and Pernot 2008: 87). This is markedly lower than in 1995. It is 
also interesting to note that the biggest difference between the two years is the conspicuous 
absence of private sector strikes. In fact the private sector accounts for less than 1 million of 
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the work days lost. It indicates that the biggest failure to mobilize seems to be located within 
the private sector and not the public sector as one might think. 
 
The disruption of French society still hurt the economy, which participants of the reform had 
expressed fears of already from early May (La Tribune 2003). According to INSEE (2003) the 
movement cost France the equivalent of 0.05 percentage points of economic growth in 2003. 
This is a substantial amount. However, the consequences pale in comparison to other 
mobilizations such as movement in 1995 which cost between 0.2-0.3 percentage points of 
economic growth. This movement was thus less consequential and had less dramatic 
economic consequences than the 1995 movement. Therefore, the negative inducements put on 
the government were less substantial than in 1995. The movement failed to threaten the 
government of a prolonged and costly conflict. This can be said to be a contributing factor to 
the final outcome of this movement.  
 
Figure 3: Main demonstrations 2003 movement 
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As can be seen from figure 3, there were huge demonstrations in France during the months of 
May and June in 2003 against the “Fillon-reform”.13 These numbers are certainly higher than 
                                                 
13 It is interesting to note the extreme difference between union estimations and official statistics provided by the 
Minister of the Interior. This big discrepancy is normal in France, but has gotten more pronounced during the 
past years. It is partly due to a difference in the way to count demonstrators, but it is also a way for either part to 
indicate a strengthening or weakening of the movement and therefore influence public opinion. This discrepancy 
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in 1995. In terms of size this should put a higher constraint on authorities since it would lead 
to more disruption and because it would increase media-attention. In the beginning 
demonstrations thus signalled a stronger message of opposition than in 1995. However, there 
is a downward trend. Between the first and second mobilization demonstrations were 25% 
lower according to the unions and over 50% lower according to the government. This gives a 
sign, not only to the movement itself, but also to the government, that mobilization is 
dwindling and losing strength. The strong signalling effect the movement had enjoyed in the 
beginning faded, giving indications that the movement would not be able threaten the re-
election of politicians. This was all the more significant since the next elections were in four 
years.  By the 19th June the number had dropped even more, and it was the de facto end of the 
movement. This shows that whilst some demonstrations may have been stronger than in 1995, 
the movement failed to frighten the government of a prolonged conflict due to its rapid 
decline.  
 
Characteristics of the movement   
 
Also when it comes to other tactical aspects such as variety and novelty these failed to come 
up with something new. Among other extreme events a MEDEF14 local office in la Rochelle 
was torched, several others tagged, and the harbour in le Havre blocked (Reuters 2003). 
However, these events were minor happenings that are not the result of a thorough tactical 
evolution. Due to the illegal nature of the former it is unlikely that this in any way was helpful 
for the movement.  
 
Social Movement Organizations 
 
At the outset of the movement CGT, FO and CFDT seemed to be on the same line of 
argument, namely that the reform was unjust and had to be withdrawn according to the first, 
or negotiated according to the latter. The 7th of January CGT, FO, CFDT, CFE-CGC, UNSA 
and FSU made a common declaration. This declaration made clear that a reform of the 
pension system was needed but that keeping the legal full retirement age at 60 was important 
(Cited in Béroud and Mouriaux 2004: 189). This symbolic element was not touched. 
                                                                                                                                                        
has been increasing in the last ten years. Le Figaro, 'Les Manifestations Sont Devenues Des Référendums ', 12 
October 2010a. 
14 Primary employers union in France 
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However, by increasing the number of years one had to have worked before acquiring full 
retirement the government made it much harder for anyone to achieve full retirement at 60 
according to the unions. The CFDT, perhaps surprisingly, denounced the government of being 
short-termist and proposing insufficient measures (Béland and Marier 2006: 306). Since the 
unions managed to agree on a call for strikes and demonstrations the 13th of May, the 
government moved quickly and started negotiations with CFDT and CFE-CGC. Both unions 
declared the 14th that they opposed the amendments that had come from the government. 
However, the following day an agreement was met and the two unions announced their clear 
support for the reform. This was seen as an apparent act of aggression by the other 
movements to an even greater extent than in 1995 because of the fact that they had engaged in 
active discussions and negotiations with the government. One could argue that the unions here 
exhibit signs of caring more for their own survival, than for actually achieving their stated 
demands (Piven and Cloward 1977). There are thus unambiguous signs of factionalizations 
between the reformist unions supporting the reform, including CFDT, CFE-CGC and CFTC, 
and the more radical unions such as the CGT, FO, UNSA and SUD who all opposed the 
reform. They continued the mobilization but it was quickly clear that they had lost 
momentum. This is completely in accordance with the lessons of Gamson (1975) and Tarrow 
(1993) who state that movements facing factionalizations are much less likely to achieve 
favourable outcomes, and perhaps especially in France. Just as predicted factionalizations 
among unions led to smaller demonstrations, less united and consensual demands and 
generally less sustained opposition to the government. This event also helped legitimate the 
government’s claim that reform was needed and supported by most French. 
 
External variables 
 
Allies 
 
When it comes to the institutional allies these were mostly located in the opposition among 
the parties of the left. As in 1995 the role of the socialist party is problematic. In 2002 the PS 
supported some of the measures of the reform which may have hurt the credibility of their 
opposition (Libération 2003c). Especially in the beginning they hesitated in supporting the 
movement. In fact, it was more a criticism of the way in which the reform had been put in 
place than the reform itself. This lack of initial support may have inhibited the movement’s 
mobilizing, as would be predicted in the literature (Giugni 2004; Tarrow 1998). As the 
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movement continued, the PS got more and more sympathetic, at least symbolically and 
publicly, towards the movement. This support materialized in heated debates in the 
parliament. Socialists proposed between 2000 and 3000 amendments, all the time claiming 
not to want to stall the debates. It was an effort to show governability by proposing a different 
reform. The communists on the other hand proposed 6 354 amendments severely slowing the 
debate in the parliament down (Les Echos 2003a). Still, stalling the debate down could do 
little to change the outcome. As in 1995 the allies failed to play the role they could have and 
the presence of these allies proved to be of little importance. The impotence of allies is linked 
to the weak mobilization by the movement. The movement did not manage to keep up 
pressure on the government once the proposal entered parliament. It is also interesting to note 
that the stalling pushed the debates further into the summer holiday and as such made it 
harder for the movement to continue mobilizing.  
 
Public opinion 
 
Figure 4: Degree of support 2003 movement 
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I concentrate here on the evolution of public opinion of the movement. When asked how they 
viewed the movement 64% declared that they either supported it or were sympathetic towards 
the movement. This is higher than for the 1995 movement. There is a steady rise until it 
abruptly falls between the 3rd and the 10th of June. The trend is the complete opposite of the 
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1995 movement. A drop of 15 percentage points is a substantial change and it is likely that it 
actually represents a shift in public opinion, especially since the exact same questions were 
asked both times (CSA 2004). This had two consequences: 1). It gave an important cue to the 
government that the tides were turning and that the opposition towards both government and 
reform would subside. In other words, the before-mentioned signalling effect diminished. 2). 
It was a heavy hit for the unions. Even though they still claimed to have the majority of the 
public on their side, the trend was clear and the movement was losing support. At the same 
time there was a gradual decline in demonstrators. These two trends are probably entwined. 
As fewer and fewer people support the movement, fewer people will demonstrate. However, 
as the movement dwindled in terms of participants it became clear that the movement would 
lose and therefore fewer people would support it. This interesting pattern may explain why the 
movement failed in providing the participants with a satisfactory outcome. When the 
movements started losing popularity the authorities knew they were on the right track and the 
electoral fears that they may have had before subsided (Giugni et al. 1999). 
 
Authorities 
 
The actions and strategies of the authorities clearly influence the chances of success for a 
movement. The 2003 movement has been used as the prime example of this. The government 
deliberately chose to introduce the movement close to summer so as to limit the mobilization 
potential of a possible movement. Also the strategic bargaining with the CFDT and CFE-CGC 
kept the movement from gaining leverage and opposing the government’s reform. This has 
brilliantly been identified by Béland and Marier (2006).  
 
I will here point out two additional measures taken by the authorities that made life more 
difficult for the movement. The first concerns the extensive framing of the reform as being 
indispensable for the well-being of the French economy. This framing is not unique and was 
also seen in 1995. However, what also existed was framing concerning the nature of the 
legitimacy of the government. As seen before, Jacques Chirac was re-elected with 82% of the 
votes in the second round in 2002. The authorities expressed several times a belief in their 
own legitimacy even to the point that the Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin exclaimed that 
“the Parliament must decide, the street must demonstrate, but it is not the street that governs”. 
He also explicitly mentioned that the government “has a nice majority”  (Béroud and 
Mouriaux 2004: 69). It is therefore clear that the government both felt like it had the majority 
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on its side, and tried to convince bystanders that they have the legitimacy needed to conduct 
such reforms (Libération 2003a). Bernard Thibault, leader of the CGT, denounced the 
government for using the election result to legitimize unpopular reforms (Libération 2003b). 
The other part of the strategy I would like to highlight is the fact that during the end of May 
the government made clear that there would be no payment for strike-days. These days could 
not be taken out as holidays (RTT-days in French), and the removal of salary would be taken 
from one or two months’ salary and not a few days for several months which had been the 
practice during many previous conflicts (Le Monde 2003). The government stated that they 
were just applying “the law, nothing else than the law, but the entire law”15. The unions on the 
other hand denounced the government for trying to keep workers from striking since the 
economic consequences of having 10 or 15 days of pay deducted from a month’s salary would 
be devastating for most workers. This probably kept many people from striking and it was an 
important reason why protest was diminished (Le Monde 2003). 
 
To summarize  
 
The failure of the 2003 movement to obtain a favourable outcome can be attributed to several 
factors. First is the relative lack of negative inducements that the movement put on the 
government. It did not manage to block the country and pose a serious threat and the slow 
rapid decay of the movement during June signalled to the government that opposition was 
residing. This is partly due to tactics put in place by the government in order to prevent the 
mobilization of workers mainly through the placement of the vote, the strict interpretation of 
the rules regarding strike days and thirdly the strategic bargaining done by the government in 
order to tempt certain unions to shift side. Coupled with this is the negative trend in public 
opinion that can be traced throughout the movement. This gave cues to the government that 
the movement would dwindle and gave incentives not to concede anything. It is also 
important to note the failure of institutional allies to play a role in the movement. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 In French “La loi, rien que la loi, mais toute la loi“ 
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4.5 The movement of 2006 
 
For this movement I will present a brief timeline, after which I will discuss the outcome of the 
movement. Following this I will explain why this particular outcome occurred drawing on the 
theories and variables identified before.  
 
4.5.1 Timeline 
 
The political context of the 2006 movement seems fairly different from the 2003 movement 
although President and Parliament remain the same. After a resounding defeat in the 
referendum for the new constitution of Europe in May 2005 Raffarin stepped down as Prime 
Minister. It was thus a weakened executive and majority that sought to continue to rule for 
another two years. The new Prime Minister, Dominique de Villepin, a close friend of the 
President, was seen as a potential successor to Chirac, and this was an opportunity to position 
de Villepin for the upcoming election in 2007 (Kesselman 2007). De Villepin’s presidential 
aspirations surely affected his behaviour, which will be further debated below.  
 
The “Contrat Premier Embauche”16 (CPE) was actually part of a larger bill called “l’égalité 
des Chances” containing numerous laws and reforms. It was supposed to make the working 
market more flexible. The CPE regarded the flexibility of youth contracts. In fact, employers 
hiring a youth (younger than 26) on this type of contract could wait two years before giving a 
full and long-term contract. During this “consolidation period” the employee could be fired at 
any moment without having the right to know the reason for the firing (Palheta 2008: 170). 
This law must be understood in the aftermath of the riots in France in the autumn of 2005 
where the death of two teenagers gave birth to important riots that shook “banlieus” all over 
France. One of the underlying causes of this riot was the lack of employment among 
marginalized youth in these areas. In fact, over 20 % of young people between 15 and 24 were 
unemployed in 2005, which is the double of the national average (Duprez 2006: 507). The 
CPE was thought to be an answer to the problem of youth unemployment generally and 
especially among youth from these areas (Kesselman 2007).   
 
                                                 
16 First Employment Contract 
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De Villepin announced the addition of the CPE to the package of laws the 16th of January 
2006, without negotiating with the unions beforehand (Lindvall 2011). The debate in the 
Assembly started the 31st. Only the CGT had called for demonstrations this day and the 
mobilization was not very strong. By the 7th of February all the student unions had denounced 
the plan and the worker unions called for a day of action. This mobilization did not attract a 
huge crowd and few believed that a real movement would be able to mobilize. The movement 
started among students in the least selective and biggest institutes, for whom the CPE would 
be the most destructive (Perrin 2011). At the same time the debate in the assembly was slow 
and ridden with obstructions by the opposition, proposing numerous amendments and points 
of order. The Prime Minister, seeing that progress was slow, decided to use a controversial 
measure in the French constitution, namely the 49-3. The parties of the left were furious with 
the decision of the Prime Minister, but the law was still adopted (Obono 2008: 161). 
 
At the same time as the debates in parliament took place the movement started to take form. It 
was a slow-starter compared with the other movements (Perrin 2011: 18). An important 
turning point came in the end of February. The five main unions announced their outright 
support to the student unions, which is very rare in France (Kesselman 2007: 22). This gave 
renewed belief that the reform could be opposed. Despite this, the law was adopted by the 
Senate the 1st of March. The socialists then appealed to the constitutional council in an effort 
to oppose the law legally. The 7th of March a “day of action” took place, reuniting around 
1 000 000 people according to the unions and 400 000 according the police. The ones 
mobilizing the strongest were the students both in high school and in University. Up to 38 
universities were already on strike by the 7th. De Villepin stated that he would continue with 
the reform and grant no concessions. The government did try to organize certain meetings 
with the unions, but these all failed because the unions refused to negotiate as long as the 
reform was not withdrawn (Lindvall 2011: 310). The movement continued and gained in 
importance all through March. The 18th between 530 000 and 1 500 000 were demonstrating 
in the streets. The 23rd 450 000 students took to the streets. These numbers paled in 
comparison with massive demonstrations the 28th of March and the 4th of April, which both 
reunited around 3 million people (Kesselman 2007: 22). At the end of March ¼ of all high 
schools and ¾ of all universities were more or less blocked (Lagrange and Oberti 2006: 1).  
 
The 30th March the constitutional council announced that the law was not opposed to the 
constitution and could therefore be promulgated by President Chirac. The following day 
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Chirac promulgated the law, but also asked parliament to immediately pass a new law that 
would reduce the time of the CPE to one year and make sure that employers would have to 
give a justification for firing a person under the CPE-contract. No contracts should be signed 
not including these measures (Perrin 2011). Following the massive demonstration of the 4th of 
April the Prime Minister agreed to negotiate with the unions the 5th. The 10th, Prime Minister 
de Villepin had to announce that the law would be retreated and replaced by a completely 
different law. According to the new law, the state would financially help firms hiring people 
without degrees from marginalized zones (Kesselman 2007). This law was adopted without 
much debate the following days.  
 
4.5.2 The outcome 
 
The movement clearly asked for the withdrawal of the CPE law. This was the most prominent 
goal among regular unions, student unions and associations, political parties etc. 
(L'Intersyndicale 2006; Libération 2006a). However, some groups also demanded deeper 
changes such as the withdrawal of the whole “loi pour l’égalité des chances”, the withdrawal 
of the CNE (“Contrat nouvelle embauche”), which was a similar law passed in 2005, or a 
complete change of social policy (Perrin 2011). As was stated in the theory chapter, the 
demands and goals of movements can vary a lot (Burstein et al. 1995). Focusing on the stated 
demands and the ones most frequently cited in the press it is nevertheless clear that the major 
goal of the movement was the CPE and its withdrawal. This can also be seen in the simple 
fact that there was almost no contention after the law had been abrogated the 10th. The 
demands were thus of a re-active character (a reaction to a bill) situated on the mid-level 
according to the framework presented before (Amenta and Young 1999). 
 
The outcome of the movement is therefore by and large a success. The reform was withdrawn 
and even replaced with another law that was supposed to alleviate some of the deeper-
reaching concerns. It is interesting to note that both the 1995 and 2006 movement obtained 
such laws. However, as in 1995, the situation did not change in any significant way and the 
underlying grievances stayed the same (Kesselman 2007). This is also highlighted among the 
unions (Le Progrès 2006a). They seem happy for the success in bringing down the CPE, but 
stay dubious about the future and fear that nothing will change. This is therefore a typical 
mid-level success where the movement managed to oppose or at least postpone the 
implementation of new disadvantages, but did not manage to create a high level success 
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entailing a radical shift in power or permanent redistribution of resources. This success is 
therefore comparable with that of the 1995 movement. 
 
4.5.3 The question of causation 
 
Regarding whether the movement influenced the outcome it seems fairly obvious. In a 
counterfactual case in which there was no movement, what would have happened to the law 
then? It was noted that the PS was awaiting the mobilization the 7th of February in order to 
respond in the best manner (Le Progrès 2006b). Without the mobilization Nicolas Sarkozy 
would have little to gain from opposing the reform. In fact he would probably decrease his 
chances of re-election. What seems to have happened is that the movement became part of the 
opportunity structure for Sarkozy, allowing him to expose the weaknesses of de Villepin. It 
thus seems highly likely that the movement did influence the outcome. 
 
4.5.4 Why did the 2006 movement succeed? 
 
As with the other movements I first assess the internal variables relating to disruption and the 
tactical repertoire, as well as the SMOs. Thereafter I highlight the external variables such as 
allies, the authorities and public opinion. 
 
Internal variables 
 
Disruption and size of the movement 
 
The disruption of society was here quite different than in the other cases. Since public agents 
striking were not the main weapon, as had been the case in 1995 the country was not blocked 
in the same way. Instead students and pupils were at the forefront of the movement. They still 
managed to disrupt society profoundly. This was not economic disruption, but more related to 
property damage and the obstruction of public places and roads. Although it was a tactic that 
was less employed than during the 2005 riots, burning cars was used occasionally by the most 
radical segments. In fact the movement remained very radical. For example, between the 8th 
of March and the 25th of March 450 police had been hurt and over 1420 people arrested 
(Lagrange and Oberti 2006: 13). According to the Collectif Assistance Juridique (CAJ) CPE 
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(CAJ 2006) 4350 people were arrested during the events between February and April. This is 
a substantial number and far higher than other similar mobilizations. CAJ (2006) explains this 
by contending that it was simply the responses from the authorities that were much stricter. Of 
the 4350 people arrested during the movement only 15% were presented before court. 
According to the CAJ this is due to a lack of evidence of violent behaviour. There is notable 
proof that several people were severely injured by the police. For example Cyril Ferez went 
into a coma after interacting with the law enforcements (CAJ 2006).  
 
This is evidence of the fear that the authorities experienced towards the movement and the 
validity of the threatening mechanism. The state especially feared that radical students would 
find common cause with youth from the banlieus and that one would experience the same 
scenario as in 2005 (Perrin 2011: 35). This could also been seen through speeches of the 
Prime Minister and then Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, which is exactly what the 
theory on disruption tells us. By threatening the interests of the state namely social order, the 
movement managed to force a response from the government. Losing control of social order 
could entail economic damage and would make the authorities less credible on security issues 
which had been one of the prime focuses of the 2002 presidential campaign. The interests 
were also personal as both Dominique de Villepin and Nicolas Sarkozy sought to strengthen 
themselves in front of the presidential elections of 2007 (Kesselman 2007). This response was 
first one of hardness and of repression. But when not even the promulgation of the law and 
important concessions from President Chirac could stem the mobilization the only possible 
solution for the authorities remained to abrogate the law.  
 
Numerous violent incidents also occurred in high schools all around the country and 
especially in parts of the marginalized municipalities of “Ile de France”, in locations such as 
Nanterre and St. Denis. The most important incidents included students from outside of the 
school (generally from professional high schools which are more precarious than regular high 
schools) coming to occupy other schools that had not yet been blocked (Lagrange and Oberti 
2006: 11). The demonstrations often took a radical turn as well, with masked youth robbing 
the demonstrators and fighting and provoking the police. In the demonstration of the 23rd 
there were between 1000 and 2000 of them (Lagrange and Oberti 2006: 13). This created a 
problem for the movement as it was clearly going over the edge when it comes to violence. 
Although the value of disruption and violence for movement outcomes has been given 
somewhat contradicting importance in the literature (Tarrow 1998), it is clear that the 
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behaviour seen during the 2006 could easily become problematic with regards to the outcome. 
In particular since this goes against laws and democratic practices and principles, and may 
frighten off potential participants (Mansbridge 1986; Soule and Olzak 2004). This did not 
however happen. In fact the movement gained in importance and the 28th even more people 
were in the streets than ever since 1995. The number of masked youth however dwindled. As 
Lagrange and Oberti (2006: 14) note, the marginalized youth of the “banlieus” even joined the 
mobilization the 28th, and participated with other youth from different social classes and 
milieus in the demonstrations. So although the movement’s radical nature was of concern, it 
did not prevent the success of the movement 
 
When looking at the size of the movement one is immediately struck by the increasing 
number of people that poured out in the streets as the movement continued. From its slow 
start in the beginning of February it reached impressive proportions in the end of March and 
beginning of April. This certainly put a lot of pressure on the politicians threatening social 
and political order. It furthermore signalled an increasingly strong contention within society 
that could prove dangerous for the 2007 election. The signals that government received 
regarding the unpopularity of the reform were stronger and stronger and showed no signs of 
residing, thereby obliging authorities to react with concessions. 
 
Figure 5: Main demonstrations 2006 
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Characteristics of the movement   
 
When it comes to variety the CPE movement sets itself apart from the other movements. The 
movement still depended on demonstrations and strikes as seen in the discussion around the 
size of the movement, but it did not limit itself to this. One of the most used tactics was that of 
occupying schools and universities. Several thousand high schools were blocked and up to 2/3 
of the universities. Two important institutions in French education, the “Ecole des hautes 
études en sciences sociales” and the Sorbonne, were occupied for several days. Sorbonne in 
particular holds an important place in the history of French social movements especially after 
the events of May 1968 (Reader and Wadia 1993). For several days students occupied the 
University, before they were thrown out by the CRS the 11th of March (Perrin 2011: 29). The 
police, wanting to avoid any reoccupation of the Sorbonne closed the area around the 
venerable University for one month. Other measures that were used were for example the 
blocking of streets and the utilization of sit-ins. This could be seen in Rennes where students 
blocked railways tracks and roads leading to and from the city, causing hours of queue. It was 
also used with great success in blocking the RN20 in Orlèans, which is a vital crossroads for 
the functioning of the city (Perrin 2011: 22). Thus, through the varied use of different tactics 
employed by the students, they managed to some extent to make up for the lack of strikes 
among railway workers which is normally needed to block the country. These tactics and their 
size surprised the authorities. This surprise can be seen in the very harsh decision to close 
down the whole Sorbonne area, which only served to give more media attention to the 
movement. The variety of actions cannot alone explain the success of the movement. 
However, it is part of a broader mix of movement-controlled variables that put vital interests 
of the state into question, made them uneasy and countered some of the restrictions that had 
been put on striking activities which was so central for the defeat of the 2003 movement.  
 
The movement mostly used a well-established repertoire of contention, consisting of 
demonstrations, strikes and occupations. A truly novel aspect however, is the use of new 
technology. SMS, e-mails and blogs made the movement able to quickly disseminate 
information regarding gatherings, news, placement of law enforcements etc (Libération 
2006b). This proved to be highly difficult for police to counter. Through the use of cell 
phones reinforcements could be called in should there be a lack of people in certain 
demonstrations. If a demonstrator was taken by the police, other demonstrators would quickly 
come to their rescue, making work much more difficult for the law enforcement. Debates 
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could be held in online forums which meant that students from diverse parts of the country 
were updated on the actions of people from all over France. Additionally, they could seek 
help and counsel on how to block a university or occupy a street etc. Information and tactics 
were thus quickly dispersed from one university to the other. 
 
Social Movement Organizations  
 
As for the organization of the movement this was fairly unique. First of all the most 
prominent actors were not in fact the regular unions. They did express their unconditional 
support to the movement, and helped calling for days of mobilizations. For the most part they 
were united and there was little factionalization and conflict between the unions. A more 
prominent position was played by the student unions like UNEF or FSE. They arranged 
assemblies and debates in schools and universities all around the country. As with the worker 
unions they called for mobilizations regularly. As was identified earlier in the literature 
review, staying united is extremely important for the outcome of a movement. This was also 
seen in the 2003 movement. By leaving differences aside and providing a fairly coherent and 
unified response to the law proposal, the unions gave the government no real opportunity to 
negotiate and break a deal with certain components of the movement, thereby splitting the 
unions and the movement (Lindvall 2011).  
 
However, the perhaps most important facet of the organization of the movement in 2006 was 
the apparent lack of it. The movement seemed more autonomous and less coordinated than 
any of the other movements. Although the movement was in the start mostly animated by 
student unions, autonomous organizations started to take more and more over as mobilization 
increased during the end of February (Perrin 2011). The 18th of February the first national 
coordination meeting (“coordination national”) was held in Rennes (Obono 2008: 162). 
Decisions were taken locally in general assemblies which voted for or against the blocking or 
occupation of schools and universities. Although this occurred in the other movements and 
has occurred in other student movements the scope at which assemblies and local debates 
decided the course of the movement makes it truly novel. The national coordination for 
students helped coordinate the different assemblies, gave unity to the movement, improved 
the capacity to mobilize and increased national publicity (Obono 2008: 169). This was further 
helped by new technology, including blogs, cell phones and e-mails. The coordination 
consisted mostly of non-unionized students that wanted to keep the control of the movement 
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out of the hands of the traditional student unions such as UNEF. This suggests that parts 
Piven and Cloward’s (1977) thesis regarding the SMOs may be true. In fact it seems that the 
movement was strengthened by the non-organization of the movement. It was not condemned 
to the same old routine repertoire, consisting of demonstrations and strikes and influenced the 
variety of tactics employed by the movement. The fact that the movement was mostly 
controlled by a non-union appealed to non-unionized students and legitimized the movement 
to the great majority of students and pupils. In fact tensions rose between the national 
coordination and UNEF. UNEF was for example criticized for “holding back” the movement 
(Perrin 2011: 19). Piven and Cloward (1977) may therefore have been right when saying that 
organization is not inevitably positive for a movement. SMOs may in fact be more interested 
in sustaining themselves in a good position rather than securing a positive outcome for the 
movement. Since the movement was not controlled by a veritable organization the movement 
could fully concentrate on repelling the reform. This is the complete contrary of what was 
seen during the 2003 movement.  
 
External variables: 
 
Allies  
 
The left parties were consistent in their support of the withdrawal of the CPE law. The left 
tried stalling the debates by introducing numerous amendments. After several days of 
debating there were still 27 articles and over 300 amendments left (Obono 2008: 160). 
However, as was said before, de Villepin forced through the pack of laws by using the 49-3. 
This seriously circumcised one of the main means of the left to help the movement. The 4th of 
April 11 parties of the left (many that are not represented in the Assembly as well), issued a 
statement denouncing the government and pleading with them to listen to the demonstrators. 
They also called on all citizens to join the demonstrations the 4th of April (Ouest France 
2006). This suggests that support from the left was both unison and long-lasting. Parties 
varying from the reformist PS to the revolutionary PC joined together to oppose the 
government.  
 
Perhaps the most important role of the institutional allies of the movement is the power to 
appeal to the constitutional council. In fact, a law cannot be promulgated until the council has 
pronounced its decision on the topic. The law was adopted the 9th of March in the parliament. 
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Immediately deputies of the left appealed to the Constitutional Council, which declared it in 
accordance with the constitution the 30th of March. During these 21 days many massive 
demonstrations would take place and therefore be able to influence the authorities. It is 
interesting to note that Chirac had changed opinion in the mean time, and granted important 
concessions. It is very unlikely that this would have happened had the law been promulgated 
three weeks earlier. As such the institutional allies of the movement do prove to be very 
important albeit in an indirect way: by buying more time for the movement to mobilize. In an 
otherwise hostile environment for opposition parties (the 49-3, block voting etc.), the 
constitutional council provides one of the few opportunities for opposition parties to actually 
have an influence, and nowhere is this more apparent than for the 2006 movement. This is one 
important mechanism that movement scholars should develop on. In fact, the lack of explicit 
mechanisms linking the presence of allies to a positive outcome has been deplored in the 
literature before (Amenta et al. 2002). One such mechanism can thus be the ability to stall 
debates and give the movement more time. In fact, within closed and strong states this may be 
the only help allies can give. This finding indicates the existence of intricate interaction 
effects. The first interaction is between allies and the institutional environment. The second 
interaction is between allies and the continued and increasing mobilization of the movement. 
As such the influence of allies is never independent of the institutions within which they exist 
nor the movement they are allied with. This finding also highlights the importance of paying 
close attention to the institutions of the state. One may claim that France is a strong state 
(Kitschelt 1986), but putting this to closer scrutiny one finds important exceptions that may 
influence the outcomes in a decisive way.  
 
The victory of the movement was not exclusively due to the allies aid, but it was made 
possible by the stalling of the allies in the parliament.  
 
Public Opinion 
 
As can be seen from figure 6 the movement enjoys a stable or even increasing support among 
people. Although it is regrettable that not more dates are available a trend may still be 
discernable. It seems that the movement is slowly gaining support and sympathy. This is 
similar to the 1995 movement but directly opposite to the 2003 movement. This gives 
important signals to organizers and authorities as to the relative popularity of a movement 
echoing the mechanisms presented by Burstein (1999). When a movement is gaining in both 
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importance (numbers) and in popularity (public opinion), it becomes harder and harder for the 
government to impose the unpopular reform. This is especially true when election year 
approaches. The CPE-movement, taking place one year before the 2007-presidential and 
legislative elections, is one such case. The government risks losing support and will therefore 
be constrained in their choices. Thinking about re-election politicians may concede, hoping to 
gain in popularity. The popularity of de Villepin and Chirac did plunge during February and 
March. The popularity of de Villepin fell from 47 % saying they had confidence in him in 
January to 29 % in March. For Chirac it went from 40% to 33% (CSA 2006). There seems to 
be little other explanation than the movement. Seeing the immense popularity of the 
movement within society the government may have been tempted to try and save the chances 
of re-election by conceding. Sarkozy also knew how to capitalize on this and used the 
unpopularity of the reform to strengthen his chances by appearing sympathetic towards the 
movement and their claims. In this case the steady and slow increase in public opinion may be 
said to influence the outcome.  
 
Figure 6: Degree of support 2006 movement  
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Authorities 
 
As opposed to the 2003 and 2010 movement the authorities did not put in place special 
measures to make protesting harder. Except for unpaid strike days, which was not an efficient 
strategy against students, no evidence of the classic protest avoidance tactics was found. The 
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authorities did use the controversial 49-3 to stop the stalling of the vote. This was criticized by 
left-wing parties and the movement itself. It was seen as forcing an unpopular law through no 
matter the means. In some way it fuelled the protests. So did the way in which the law was 
introduced. No discussions or negotiations with civil society or the opposition were held prior 
to announcing the law in the middle of January. Condemnation of the method used by de 
Villepin was also present among the right. In fact, one can identify important factionalizations 
among the parliamentary majority. This occurred especially between Nicolas Sarkozy, 
minister of the Interior and leader of the UMP, and de Villepin, the Prime Minister. Although 
Sarkozy repeatedly denounced the movement for its radicalism, he regularly criticized the 
CPE and the lack of negotiations (Libération 2006a). He tried to force the government to open 
negotiations so that solutions could be found. One could be tempted to call Sarkozy an ally of 
the movement. He did provide ample criticism of the government and seemed to forward 
goals relative to the movement. However, it is important to identify the true reasons behind 
his support for the movement. It is clear that his criticism of the government was motivated by 
a wish to expose de Villepin as fragile and impose an important political defeat on him. This 
is because, as discussed before, de Villepin was the favourite to become the candidate of the 
right in the 2007 presidential campaign. By fragilizing the Prime Minister Sarkozy hoped to 
place himself in front of the election (Kesselman 2007).  
 
To summarize 
 
The 2006 movement was a clear success. The success is mainly due to massive and varied 
mobilizations, which went on over a long period of time. This was coupled with a strong and 
favourable public opinion that increased the fears that the party would lose in the upcoming 
elections. Furthermore, the actions of Sarkozy, in his quest for presidential office, undermined 
the unity of the majority and provided further pressure on the government. This suggests that 
internal divisions within the elite may make favourable outcomes more likely. Lastly the help 
of allies within the opposition which postponed the promulgation of the law bought time for 
the movement and suggests that this may be one of the crucial mechanisms by which allies 
may help produce reactive policy successes.  
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4.6 The movement of 2010 
 
For the 2010 movement I first present a brief timeline. I then discuss the outcome and how it 
can clearly be defined as a failure. In the last part I discuss the relevant factors that can help 
explain this outcome. 
 
4.6.1 Timeline 
 
The political context in which the movement of 2010 took place was different from the other 
contexts. Nicolas Sarkozy had been elected in 2007 fairly comfortably winning over his 
socialist rival, Segolène Royal, with 53.06 % of the votes. His campaign was based on a 
conservative platform, emphasizing the need for both economic and social reforms. He played 
heavily on right-wing rhetoric, thereby largely eliminating Jean-Marie le Pen of the Front 
National as a competitor (Sauger 2007). During his first few years as President he enacted 
several controversial reforms, most famously perhaps the LRU-reform in 2009, which aimed 
at establishing more autonomy for Universities (Mabut 2009). The financial crisis in 2008 hit 
France hard and led to a surge in unemployment, reaching 9.5% in 2009 (INSEE 2009). This 
number was even higher for young people, particularly from disadvantaged areas around 
major cities. At the same time debt increased at a remarkable pace. At the end of 2010 debt 
represented 81,5% of GDP and amounted to 1 574,6 billion euro (INSEE 2010). Budget 
deficits were consistently above the 3% EU-limit. Adding to this was the demographic change 
occurring in France, as elsewhere. This would mean further problems of financing the 
generous French welfare state. It was therefore more and more clear that something had to be 
done about expenses. Already in 2006 Sarkozy announced that he would reform the pension 
system as soon as he got into power. Early in his period Sarkozy reformed the “regime 
speciaux” (Lindvall 2011). However, he would wait to the beginning of 2010 before 
proceeding with a more profound reform of the whole pension system. 
 
The 15th of February Nicolas Sarkozy announced that he was planning to reform the pension-
system in September. It was to be done in negotiation and not to be forced through during the 
summer as in 2003. The unions were unhappy and organized March 23rd massive 
demonstrations around France. Between 380 000 and 800 000 joined the demonstrations and 
some sectors were touched by 24 hour strikes. During April certain negotiations took place, 
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however many unions were not content and feared that the authorities would force the reform 
through. Awaiting the announcement of the content of the reform, several big demonstrations 
were held the 27th of May. Between 395 000 and 1 000 000 people were in the streets this 
day. The movement was furious when it learned, the 16th June, that several controversial 
measures were part of the reform. A worker having worked the required years would have to 
work till 62 and not 60, whereas a person, not having the required work years, would have to 
wait till 67 instead of 65. Negotiations were finished two days later, and the content was 
unitarily denounced by all unions. Just before the summer holidays 2010, the 24th of June, 
massive demonstrations took place, which gathered between 797 000 and 2 million in the 
whole of France. Certain parts of the establishment, namely Xavier Darcos wanted to 
introduce the reform to the parliament during the World Cup, hoping that this would quell any 
mobilization. Other advisors to Sarkozy advised against this and believed that the reform 
could be introduced without too much opposition, and it was therefore decided that the reform 
would be enacted during autumn (Mediapart 2010a). Just after school started again in the 
beginning of September hostilities began. September 7th the biggest demonstrations up till 
then took place, in which between 1,12 and 2,7 million participated. This coincided with the 
opening of the debate in the Parliament. The 8th Sarkozy announced that he would actually 
back down on a minor issue, namely that people who were incapacitated just 10 % instead of 
20 % could take their leave at 60 (La Correspondance Economique 2010). However, this was 
but a minor detail, and the movement continued.  
 
Already the 15th September was the law voted in the National Assembly. However, it would 
need to pass Senate as well. The movement therefore mobilized heavily again September 23rd 
when up to 3 million according to the organizers and 997 000 according to the police were in 
the streets. Fillon refused to budge and the movement continued 9 days later with 
demonstrations of a similar magnitude. Three days after this the Senate started examining the 
law. At the same time workers in several public firms such as the SNCF and especially oil 
refineries threatened to start renewable strikes, which they did the 12th of October. The 
biggest demonstrations to date happened the same day with between 1,2 million and 3,5 
million people in the streets. Four days later a slightly smaller day of contention occurred. 
This was reproduced the 19th when between 1,1 and 3,5 million people demonstrated against 
the reform. University and High-School students had joined the movement earlier. At this 
point in time the strikes and blockings of the oil refineries started to lead to a depletion of fuel 
in many parts of the country. Three days later the situation regarding fuel had become quite 
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dangerous and police and “services d’ordre” started to clear blockades etc., in order to put an 
end to the strikes. The very same day the Senate adopted the law, and the 27th it was in its 
final version adopted by the parliament. November 2nd socialists and greens united to appeal 
to the Constitutional Council, arguing that the reform was against the constitution. The 
Council, however, ruled that the law not was against the constitution. Nicolas Sarkozy 
promulgated the law the 9th of November. When it started to become clear that the movement 
would not win a slow demobilization occurred. The 25th of October an end to the strikes was 
announced at most of the oil refineries, and the 29th all refineries were back to normal. Even 
though the law had already been adopted the movement mobilized first October 28th and then 
the 6th of November. Both times the number of participants was in heavy decline. It is logical 
that the demonstrations would not be as strong since it was after the law had been voted. 
These demonstrations were more to show that the movement was not dead and for some, that 
this was the beginning of the presidential campaign in 2012. This is illustrated through one of 
the banners which read “Sarkozy, you’ve won your retirement in 2012”. UNSA, CFTC, FO 
and CGC proclaimed that they were against continuing the strikes. Although several unions 
(notably CGT and CFDT) claimed they would continue the movement by arguing that a 
democracy is not simply voting in an election every five years, only small demonstrations 
have since occurred.  
 
4.6.2 The outcome 
 
The demands of the movement were once again the withdrawal of the pension reform and 
especially its most controversial content relating to the increase of the retirement age to 62 
and 67 for people having worked the required years and those that had not. Asking for the 
unconditional withdrawal was also accompanied by demands for negotiations and of being 
included in such negotiations (Le Monde 2010d). However, negotiations were not an end in 
itself. It is thus safe to say that, as with the other movement the demands were situated on a 
medium level, involving reactive demands. However, to a lesser degree than in 1995 did the 
movement ask for a radical change in society. The more high-level, proactive demands seem 
to have vanished.  
 
It is clear that the movement as a whole was a failure. The reform plan was adopted and the 
contested measures were implemented. Only very negligible concessions were made, and 
cannot even be characterized as a minor success. Although several of the unions involved 
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tried to claim that it was a success in the way that the movement had been able to hold some 
of the biggest demonstrations France had ever experienced, it seems as more of a justification 
for future adherents than an objective assessment of the outcome. Nevertheless, one thing 
mentioned several times is the 2012 elections and what possible consequences the movement 
can have on this election. This is however, too early to tell, and should not be included in the 
present analysis of the outcome. Therefore it is safe to say that the movement failed in 
obtaining its stated goals.  
 
4.6.3 Why did the 2010 movement fail? 
 
As with the other movements I will in this part identify the causes of the failure of the 
movement. I first concentrate on the internal variables and later focus on the external ones. 
 
Internal variables  
 
Disruption and size of the movement 
 
From the beginning of the movement it was clear that the disruption of society was fairly 
heavy. The country was several times blocked partly or completely due to strikes and large 
demonstrations. A peculiarity is the strong presence of refinery workers. As numerous 
refineries started striking, fears of running out of gas quickly spread. The 16th of October as 
many as 12 refineries were completely blocked, seriously endangering the short term supply 
of fuel to stations. As people feared they would soon ran out of fuel they met up in large 
numbers to tank up, thus creating long queues and depleting the stations at an even faster rate. 
In fact by the 20th of October 1/3 of all gas stations had no or little fuel left. The government 
claimed to have 98 days worth of reserves, but people were still afraid (Reuters 2010). This is 
exactly the kind of negative inducements that according to the literature may lead the 
government to back down and open negotiations. The government did react, but it was with 
force and repression that the situation would be solved.  
 
When it comes to the economic costs of the movement the official statistics are not yet 
available. However, the French minister of finance, Christine Lagarde stated that the 
movement cost between 1.6 and 3.2 billion euros, which would entail a loss of economic 
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growth of 0.08 to 0.16 percentage points (Le Figaro 2010b). This is a substantial amount of 
money, especially for a country that has been struggling since the financial crisis of 2008. The 
costs are higher than the 2003 movement, however slightly lower than the movement in 1995. 
The turnover in transportation moreover decreased by 1.7% mainly due to the movement 
(INSEE 2011). 2554, mainly youth, were arrested during the movement and several violent 
incidents involving youth occurred. During these incidents 72 policemen were injured (Le 
Figaro 2010c). The radical elements were thus fairly prominent. However, compared with the 
2006 movement it seemed to propose a less substantial threat to social and political order, 
although it was more economically costly. The economic threat was also more profound than 
during the 2003 movement, albeit less than in 1995. It seems as though the threatening 
mechanism, although present, remained inferior to the two success movements. 
 
Figure 7: Main demonstrations 2010 movement 
Main demonstrations 2010 movement
0
500 000
1 000 000
1 500 000
2 000 000
2 500 000
3 000 000
3 500 000
4 000 000
Ma
y 2
7th
Ju
ne
 2
4th
 
Se
pte
m
be
r 7
th
Se
pte
mb
er
 2
3rd
Oc
tob
er 
2n
d 
Oc
tob
er
 12
th
Oc
tob
er
 16
th
 
Oc
tob
er
 19
th
Oc
tob
er
 28
th
No
ve
m
be
r 6
th
 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
eo
p
le
According to the state
According to the unions
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The 2010 movement was particularly big with its massive mobilizations, five of which 
exceeded three million participants according to the unions. This put pressure on the 
government as discussed before. It was also a very strong signal to the government that the 
reform was unwanted. There were numerous references to the 2012 presidential elections and 
there was a fear that this might be very costly to the government as it had been for de Villepin 
in 2006. The signalling mechanism is therefore very strong. However, as I will show in the 
public opinion part below, the core UMP sympathizers, susceptible to vote for Sarkozy in 
2012, were favourable to the reform. The authorities could therefore ignore the strong signals 
 86
it got from the movement. Another interesting aspect is the enormous differences in state and 
union estimates. This may be evidence that the movement tries to give an impression of 
strength to the general public in order to win their sympathy and to show the authorities the 
extent of contention within society. These are two mechanisms pointed to by Burstein (1999).  
 
Characteristics of the movement   
 
Regarding variety and novelty the 2010 movement seems fairly unoriginal. The main set 
actions remained strikes and especially demonstrations. Some note that demonstrations even 
seemed to take the role of the strike17. There were some occupations, especially of the 
refineries, which induced heavy costs on economy and society. This is a somewhat new tactic, 
but hardly revolutionary as this has occurred numerous times before. Thus the police knew 
how to respond to the occupations and repressed them after some time quite heavily. As such 
the absence of a wide variety of truly novel actions could be said to be a contributing factor to 
failure of the 2010 movement, especially compared with the 2006 movement. 
 
Social Movement Organizations 
 
As with the 1995 and 2003 movement the prime SMOs of the 2010 movement were the 
various unions. What is striking is the shift in alliances after the 2003 movement. In 2003 
CFDT did not join the movement and sided with the government. In 2010 CFDT was firmly 
with the CGT calling for the withdrawal of the postponement of the legal age to 62 and 67 (Le 
Monde 2010b). The FO, who in 1995 and 2003 had been on the side of CGT chose to go 
alone in this movement (Les Echos 2010). They did not sign letters and demands signed by 
the other unions, but still called for demonstrations the same days. FO claimed that this was 
because none of the other unions wanted to call for a general strike, judged too risky by 
unions like CGT and CFDT which feared they would lose a place in potential negotiations 
with the government. Especially CFDT feared a radicalization of the movement, which would 
hurt their “reformist” image. Their restraint was also probably linked to the fact that many 
                                                 
17 Fillieule and Tartakowsky (2008) show that demonstrations have become more popular generally over the 
past 20 years. In 1983 28 % could confirm that they had participated in a demonstration. By 2004 this number 
had increased to 55 %.  
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people, unionists included, did not believe they would be able to succeed. Indeed, many felt 
that Sarkozy would never back down (Mordillat 2011: 79).  
 
This shows exactly the fears that Piven and Cloward (1977) voiced when they warned of 
social movement organization and bureaucratization. Most organizations will start caring 
more for their own survival than for the fulfilling of demands (McAdam 1982). Other unions 
claimed that FO maintained this position to appear to be more radical so as to gather more 
adherents. The fact that SMOs may start competing for the same people has been noted for 
various movements by other scholars (Rucht 2004). For the most part however, the SMOs 
avoided a too strong factionalization which has been seen to have detrimental consequences 
for the success of movements (Gamson 1975; Steedly and Foley 1979). The factionalization 
of the movement was not big enough to pose serious problems, especially since none of the 
unions explicitly took side with the government such as in 2003. In fact, the split happened to 
the left with those who wanted to go further and not to the right with those supporting the 
reform. As such the factionalization was not an important variable in explaining the failure of 
the 2010 movement. 
 
External variables 
 
Allies 
 
As with the other movements the main allies can be found on the left, within the PS and PC. 
Other entities also expressed negative sentiments towards the reform. These include the 
centrist party of MoDem and de Villepin, former Prime Minister under Chirac, and 
“archenemy” of Sarkozy. They both demanded the government to review the reform and 
“listen to the people” (La Correspondance Economique 2010). Still, the major role was played 
by socialists and communists. As with the other reforms the PS found itself drawn between 
two cultures: one culture of opposition and one culture of government. Early on the PS 
seemed to be positive towards a reform and Martine Aubry announced the 17th of January 
2010 that she was favourable to an increase to 61 or 62 years in order to reach full pension 
with enough contribution years (Mediapart 2010b). Later she would go back on this and 
criticize the government. Segolène Royal, the 2007 PS presidential candidate said on the other 
hand that the PS would revert legal retirement age back to 60 if they got into power in 2012 
(Le Journal de Dimanche 2010). There were many divergent voices within the PS. Some, as 
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Royal, wanted the complete withdrawal of the reform and even holding referendums on it. 
Others wanted merely a freeze in the reforms and new negotiations. A different factor was the 
fact that Dominique Strauss Khan, until recently a PS favourite for the 2012 presidential 
elections and former leader of the IMF, had earlier advocated an increase in the retirement age 
(Marianne 2010b). There was thus a lack of credibility in the actions of the PS and they were 
not speaking with one voice. They still supported the movement and participated in 
demonstrations.  
 
Once again however, we see that the PS is torn between wanting to use the movement to 
gather more support, and its fears of coming in a situation where its credibility is put into 
question. The movement, composed of many individuals that are susceptible to vote for the 
left, thus presented a potential for the allies. Sarkozy was seen in a worse and worse light and 
he was plummeting on the polls. The reform therefore presented a good opportunity for the 
PS, which they hope to use to their advantage. This has been highlighted in the literature as 
essential in order to gather support from allies (Amenta et al. 2005; Della Porta and Diani 
2006; Lipsky 1968). The popularity of Martine Aubry, the leader of the PS, did increase 
slightly over the period. However this increase was minor and it is clear that they did not 
manage to capitalize on the unpopularity of Sarkozy (Le Figaro 2010d). The PS continued its 
support of the movement also in parliament. However, due to new constitutional rules debate 
time in the assembly is limited to 75 hours, which means that the PS was not able to propose 
as many amendments as they had been able to before. Within the Senate the reform was also 
pushed trough by a frightened executive. Despite these preventive measures put in place by 
the authorities the PS managed to stall the debates in the Senate where they and PC together 
announced 1 200 amendments (Le Monde 2010a). Nevertheless, the PS failed once again to 
help the movement in achieving its goals. Instead, it tried to use the movement to gain 
momentum in front of the difficult 2012 campaign (Mediapart 2010c). 
 
There was no attempt among intellectuals to write petitions and encourage the participants of 
the movement as was the case in 1995 with Bourdieu (Le Monde Diplomatique 2010). 
Although playing only a very minor role in 1995, the lack of an organized intervention by 
intellectuals reinforced the impression that neither movement nor its allies could propose a 
credible alternative.   
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Public opinion 
 
Figure 8: Degree of support 2010 movement 
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As can be seen from figure 8 it is hard to find any clear trend. The degree of support 
fluctuates between 65 and 71 % most of the time. Although there is a dip in the end it is hard 
to impute this to a downward trend since it is not a very big dip and especially since it has 
occurred before and rebounded. The degree of support is high. In fact, it is the highest for any 
of the movements in my study. According to much theory this should be more than enough to 
secure a favourable outcome for the movement since politicians will fear for their re-election. 
However, this is not the case. What does this indicate? This makes the point that public 
opinion alone cannot account for movement outcomes. It is not enough for a movement to 
enjoy strong public support. It seems that Burstein (1998; Burstein and Linton 2002) may be 
overstating the importance of public opinion. However, it may be that protest movements 
mobilizing in a reactive manner cannot count as strongly on public opinion as perhaps 
proactive movements since the costs for politicians granting the concessions may be stronger. 
Nevertheless, as Uba (2009) writes, it may also be that politicians only care about certain 
parts of public opinion. Looking at what can be said to be the core-electorate of Sarkozy, 
namely UMP sympathizers, one finds that they remained overly positive towards the reform. 
Over 70% of them judged it to be positive (Le Monde 2010c). Furthermore, only 4 % of UMP 
sympathizers said that the reform would keep them from voting for Sarkozy in 2012, and over 
31% said it would actually increase their propensity to vote for him (IFOP 2010). Should the 
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government cave in to the demands of its core-electorate it could therefore cost him his re-
election, even if general public opinion was very sympathetic towards the movement. This 
shows that perhaps Uba (2009) is right, and that what really counts is the core-electorate.  
 
Authorities  
 
I will here go through the actions of the government in response to the movement according 
to the protest avoidance perspective of Bèland and Marier (2006). This may perhaps be the 
most important part of explaining the failure of the movement. In fact it appears that both the 
strategies of the authorities and rules that condition the legislative debate, has changed. Thus, 
both the dynamic and certain statist parts of the POS have changed (Meyer and Staggenborg 
1996) The political context is therefore less open for social movement influence. The first 
change concerns the tactical repertoire. In terms of the right to strike this is unchanged. 
However, due to many factors it has become more difficult to strike and therefore to use the 
strike, which proved to be so efficient in 1995. As in 2003 strike days are not paid and they 
are accumulated on one or two months of pay, which means that a worker may lose half of 
one month’s salary. Some workers claimed to lose 70 euro per strike day which was stated as 
problematic for the continuation of the strikes (Magnaudeix 2010). This cost put a serious 
constraint on the willingness to strike among workers and thus made it more difficult to block 
the country. A second issue further complicated the mobilization of workers. This was the 
minimum service which was installed the 21st August 2007. This law had been wanted by 
both right-wing parties and from interest groups like “Liberté Chèrie” for several years, and 
the debate flourished at each big movement. The law of 2007 does not install a minimum 
service per se. It merely means that strikers will have to declare their intention to strike 48 
hours before they go on strike in order for local authorities to arrange alternatives for users of 
especially transports and schools (Le Pors 2007). This had two important consequences. 
Firstly, it was harder for workers to mobilize since the bureaucratic rules became stricter. 
Secondly, because local authorities could plan better and therefore install alternatives in 
transports and for schools, the effects of the strikes were less serious and completely blocking 
the country was much harder. These rules defining the right to strike are part of what could be 
characterized as the dynamic POS. This can quite easily be changed and conditions and 
influences both the mobilization potential of a movement and its chances for success. This is 
exactly what happened in this case where the law on minimum service affected both of these 
variables (Mordillat 2011: 83). The finding further indicates that the rules which regulate 
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collective action has important consequences and that changes in these can influence actions. 
This is an area where little research has been conducted since they have mostly been taken as 
stable.  
 
The second part of the strategy by the authorities to avoid movement success was to hasten up 
the debate in the parliament. Nicolas Sarkozy changed parts of the constitution in 2008 in 
order to modernize the state. Part of this change was that the assembly itself decides how 
much time was allocated to the debate of laws (Legifrance 2009). Certain socialist deputies 
criticised this reform for threatening the power of the opposition. For the 2010 reform this 
was limited to 75 hours in the assembly, which meant that the opposition could not stall the 
debate and “buy” time for the movement to the same degree as before. As such, the potential 
main asset for the movement was compromised. In the Senate no limit had been set as to the 
time because the President of the Senate did not want to impose any limits on the debate. As 
debates continued and the movement became more radicalized with the entry of students and 
youth, the government realized that something had to be done. The authorities therefore used 
a different measure in its repertoire, namely the “vote unique” established in article 44-3 of 
the constitution (Le Figaro 2010e). A “vote unique” means that there will only be one single 
vote for all the amendments. Even though each amendment can still be discussed, a lot of time 
is saved by not voting for each and everyone. This measure was heavily criticised by leftist 
senators, but Eric Woerth, the minister responsible for the reform responded that 120 hours 
had been used to debate the reform and that this was enough (Le Monde 2010c). Both these 
measures circumcised the parliamentary opposition and kept them from helping the 
movement. It is more than plausible that these measures are at least partly responsible for the 
failure of the movement (Mordillat 2011). 
 
Other measures taken by the government were for example to early in August grant students 
important concessions especially in terms of allocations. This was thought to keep the 
students out of the movement and away from the streets and thereby avoiding to accumulate 
unpopular reforms at the same time which happened in 1995 and partly in 2003. There were 
also discussions among the elite on whether to introduce the reform during the World Cup 
2010 (Marianne 2010a). However, this was thought to too very risky.  
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Once again the actions of the authorities to prevent protest seem to have had an influence on 
the outcome of the movement. The POS was therefore more closed to the influence of social 
movements. Both the mobilization and the outcome of the movement were effected by this. 
 
To understand the strong reactions of the authorities towards the movement one needs to pay 
attention to two factors. The first relates to the political timing of the movement. Being so 
close to election time Sarkozy was obliged to please his electorate which was largely 
favourable to the reform as seen in the public opinion part. It is unlikely that participants in 
the movement would vote for him either way, so pleasing them would be costly and defectors 
could go to other rightwing parties and candidates. This was coupled with a favourable 
international political climate for reform. Mainly due to the international financial crisis there 
was growing concern over how solvent the French economy would be and threats of 
degrading the financial grade from AAA to AA caused substantial fear in French financial 
sectors. This provided Sarkozy with the support and the will to oppose the population and 
force the reform through while negating the claims of the movement (Mordillat 2011: 85). 
These two features show the intense complexity of movements and their outcomes. It also 
suggests that further research must be done to incorporate such features in existing theories 
and models.   
 
To summarize 
 
The failure of the 2010 movement can be accounted to the lack of social and economic 
disruption presented by the movement. Although the signals presented by the enormous 
demonstrations were substantial the threatening mechanism seemed to be less prominent. The 
lack of strikes can partly be attributed to measures put in place by the government to reduce 
the effectiveness of these. Although allies were present among the political parties there was 
uncertainty as to the sincerity of their support and as such their credibility was low. 
Furthermore, debates in the assembly, where the opposition could have played a role, were 
compromised by the majority through a variety of measures. Public opinion remained very 
favourable to the movement, but it was not enough to persuade the President, partly because 
his own electorate was strongly in favour the reform.  
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5.0 Conclusions:  
 
I will in this part summarize the findings and establish the theoretical implications of my 
thesis. I start off by summarizing the different factors and mechanisms. Thereafter I discuss 
the theoretical implications and certain limitations of this study and suggest venues for future 
research 
 
5.1 The main findings of the thesis 
 
The main goal of this thesis was to explain why some movements fail and others succeed. To 
do this I identified several relevant theoretical variables that have been known to affect 
movement outcomes. These were then used to explain the four movements in this case. I will 
here provide a cross case summarization of the different variables. 
 
Disruption and size of the movement 
Regarding disruption my thesis suggests that the degree of movement disruptiveness is 
important for a movement to succeed. High disruptiveness and the threat this posed to the 
government was seen to be central in the explanation of the 1995 and the 2006 movement. In 
the two other cases, which failed, the threat of the movements was of lesser importance. This 
does not mean that movements will automatically succeed if they are disruptive. Indeed, it is 
important to remember that even in the two cases that failed, disruption was massive 
compared to what most movements can hope to achieve. Regarding the size of the movement 
this is correlated with disruption, although the 2010 movement suggests that this is not always 
true. The signalling mechanism remains potent in the success cases, but was not enough in the 
2010 movement. In fact, even though signals were possibly the strongest in this case, the 
movement was unable to influence the outcome. This suggests that the most important of the 
two mechanisms is threat.  
 
Movement characteristics 
As for the other tactical measures, namely variety and novelty, these did not differ that much. 
Tilly (1986) indicated that the repertoire of movements rarely changes, and as such it is not a 
big surprise that novelty regarding the repertoire was found to be lacking. What was found 
however to change the outcome was the use of new technologies which helped circumvent the 
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police, increase the size of the movement and help to the diversity of the repertoire. Regarding 
variety the most varied movement was successful. However, it is clear that a movement can 
be successful without using a wide variety of tactics, such as the 1995 movement did. One 
cannot either say that this is a sufficient condition as it is impossible to exclude the existence 
of other movements, employing a varied repertoire that did not obtain favourable outcome.  
 
Factionalization and bureaucratization 
Regarding the last of the internal variables it seems that a movement can be successful both in 
the absence of strongly bureaucratized SMOs and in the presence of such. The 2006 
movement shows that a movement that is not hierarchically organized, but rather dispersed 
and decentralized can achieve substantial results. This was clearly helped by the use of new 
technologies. Regarding bureaucratically organized movements they are clearly penalized 
when they appear factionalized. This was especially true for the 2003 movement. Whereas the 
1995, 2006 and 2010 movements were fairly united, the 2003 movement saw heavy 
factionalization. Once again it is apparent that no single variable can explain everything.  
 
Allies 
Regarding the external variables I find that the role of allies is dubious. Every single 
movement had their share of allies overwhelmingly situated within the opposition among the 
parties of the left. Generally the allies seemed to have little effect, even when the outcome 
was favourable, except for the 2006 movement. In fact due to the actions of the left parties in 
opposition and their technique of stalling, both through presenting numerous amendments and 
appealing to the Constitutional Council they managed to stall the promulgation enough for the 
movement to establish itself and gain ground so as to make it impossible for the President to 
go ahead without making concessions. This is an important mechanism that has been 
overlooked in the literature. It has the potential of being very important, but is fruitless 
without the consistency of the movement, which could for example be seen in 2003. This 
corroborates the political mediation view which asserts that movement variables and the 
political context should be taken into consideration together.  
 
Public opinion 
The second external variable is public opinion. The first thing to note is that public opinion 
was favourable for every movement, with over 50% expressing sympathy or support for the 
movement in question. This means that public opinion is not a magic remedy for social 
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movements. Burstein and Linton (2002) claim that when public opinion is added social 
movements are left with little influence. This thesis poses serious questions as to the 
legitimacy of this claim. Based on the 2010 movement it may seem that the opinion of core 
voters is the most important. However, with these four cases one clearly sees that social 
movement influence is not reducible to public opinion alone. The findings do, however, 
corroborate and build on Burstein’s (1999) idea that social movements can influence the 
outcome by influencing the preferences of the public. This is clear in the two successful cases. 
In the two unsuccessful cases the movement did not manage to any large extent to influence 
the perceptions of the public. Thus, it is perhaps not public opinion in itself that is important. 
It is the degree to which the movement manages to increase favourable public opinion that is 
relevant.  
 
Authority strategy 
The final variable of interest was that of the authorities and their strategy. This has often been 
overlooked in the literature. There is clear evidence that in the two successful cases the 
authorities engaged in heavy protest avoidance tactics. This was done through framing, new 
laws regarding striking, laws regarding voting and the use of controversial constitutional 
measures. These seem to have two effects: 1). it reduces the size and disruptive potential of 
movements; 2). it shortens or negates debate in the parliament by pushing through the bill. 
These are detrimental both for the movement in itself and for its allies whose favourite 
mechanism, stalling, is compromised (although not completely which the 2006 case shows).  
 
Table 2: Summarizing table 
 
 
Movement 1995 2003 2006 2010 
Disruption and 
threat 
Heavy Medium Heavy Medium 
Size and signals Big Medium Big  Big 
Variety Little Little Much Little 
Novelty Little Little Medium Little 
Organization Bureaucratic Bureaucratic Not bureaucratic Bureaucratic 
Fractionalization Medium Much Little  Little 
Allies Present Present Present Present 
Public Opinion High and 
increasing 
High and 
decreasing 
High and 
increasing 
High and stable 
Authorities No PAT PAT No PAT PAT 
Outcome Success Failure Success  Failure 
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Following table 2 it is clear that a movement that either manages to remain fairly united or 
without any hierarchical formation stands the best chance of succeeding. Disruption and size, 
through their threat to social order and signalling of discontent influence positively the 
chances for success of a movement. Negotiations and moderation will often lead to the demise 
of the movement, especially when factionalized. All movements enjoyed important allies. 
However, these are not a guarantee for success, and will rarely play an important role. They 
may play a secondary role through the use of stalling techniques. Public opinion, while 
important is not as reliable as one would think. Authorities simply do not always react to 
public opinion. Finally, the strategies of the authorities serve to hinder both mobilization and 
allies within the parliament. These considerations seem to explain quite well the different 
movements.  
 
5.2 Implications of the study 
 
The implications of my study are manifold. First of all for French movements it highlights the 
importance of the actions of the movement itself. Even when the odds are not favourable they 
can succeed. However, if the government feels strongly about a reform it will be much harder 
to get through, especially when faced with explicit strategies to limit movements. Allies, 
namely political parties, can be valuable, but remain insignificant if the movement does not 
manage to mobilize properly.  
 
When it comes to reactive movements this study shows that having allies does not equal 
success. This questions the quintessential importance of allies for certain scholars (Tarrow 
1998). In fact, since the movements mobilize in reaction to the government proposals it is 
hard for allies to influence the preferences of the government. Indeed it will have to use other 
tactics to influence the outcome. Allies will therefore often use stalling. Alone, stalling cannot 
account for movement outcomes. It is only in conjunction with other factors that stalling is 
useful. This mechanism cannot either be translated to proactive movements since stalling is 
exactly the contrary of what such a movement wants.  
 
On a general note this is further confirmation that both aspects of the general political 
mediation model, meaning movement and political context are important, and that one should 
not exclusively focus on either one (Amenta et al. 2005). It corroborates the findings of 
McAdam and Su (2002) that indicate that threatening mechanisms are more important than 
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signalling mechanisms. As a side note, it becomes apparent when analyzing the movements 
that disruption may give strong signals in addition to threats, just as size remains threatening 
in addition to giving signals to politicians. As such, keeping the two mechanisms separate and 
contending that they constitute rival explanations may be unwarranted. The thesis also puts 
into question the hypothesis forwarded by Burstein (1998) that when public opinion is added, 
little else is needed to explain movement outcomes. The different cases show that even when 
public opinion is highly favourable success is not guaranteed. This thesis also corroborates a 
different part of his theory, namely that one of the ways a movement may have an impact is 
by influencing the preferences of the public, which could be seen in the rapid increase of 
public opinion which took place following mobilizations in 1995 and 2006. Another 
important aspect the need to delve into the empirical aspects of states and not content oneself 
with a description of a state as closed, open etc. In fact, even though the French state is very 
strong in many measures, important opportunities are available to social movements and their 
allies, namely through appealing to the constitutional council. As such movements are not 
condemned to failure even closed and strong states.  
 
This also highlights the importance of the strategies of authorities, which should be included 
as a dynamic element of the opportunity structure and extended from a mere focus on 
repression and protest policing. It also implies that a learning process takes place. It means 
that movements do not occur independently of each other. Both demonstrators and authorities 
learn from past mistakes and can adopt different strategies from before. This is seen especially 
among authorities since they generally enjoy a greater continuity than movements. The 2003 
movement learned from 1995, 2006 learned from riots in 2005, whereas the 2010 movement 
could draw lessons from all past experiences, obviously including movements not covered 
here. In many ways the 1995 movement marked the minds of policy makers much in the way 
May 1968 did up until then. This contingency may explain the actions of the authorities and is 
an indication of a learning process which to a large extent has been lacking in current 
research.  
 
5.3 Limitations and future research 
 
There are certain limits to my study. The most obvious is the problem of inference. Although 
my main objective was not to generalize to the whole population I still wanted to make 
limited generalizations relevant to general social movement literature. My study does not 
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contain enough cases to provide “statistical significant” results. As such I am very careful 
when discussing the relevance for my study outside of the particular cases in question. I 
therefore use words such as “strengthen” and “corroborate” to designate my findings. 
Including more cases and thereby strengthening my results could be done using different 
methodological devices, such as the Qualitative Comparative Analysis method. This has been 
used in several studies of social movements (Giugni and Yamasaki 2009; Amenta et al. 2005) 
and helps making sense of intricate relationships among a medium amount of cases. Such a 
study could incorporate the many potential cases discussed in the methods chapter and test the 
findings highlighted in this thesis. The current study, having identified a combination of 
various variables that seem to yield a particular outcome, could form the necessary basis of 
such a research design.  
 
Future research should also focus on a more profound understanding of governments as 
rational actors adopting various tactics in order to prevent mobilization and avoid being 
influenced by movements. The various tactics found in this thesis can and should form the 
basis for future studies on other movements, both proactive and reactive. These tactics should 
be exported to contexts other than the French one. 
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